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Annex 1: Main features of pension systems in the EU 
 
Pension arrangements are very diverse in the EU Member States, due to both different 
traditions on how to provide retirement income, and to different phases of the reform process 
of pension systems. 
The large majority of pension systems in the EU 27 Member States are public pension 
systems. Still, several Member States have introduced occupational pension schemes and/or 
private mandatory and voluntary schemes. As documented by Table 1, pension arrangements 
are very diverse in the EU. The importance of occupational and private pension provisions 
varies across countries.  
Regarding the type of pension benefit paid out by public earnings-related schemes, most 
Members States provide defined-benefit pensions, i.e. pension rights are defined in terms of 
earnings and service years, without a direct link to contributions. But recently, a number of 
Member States, including Sweden and some new Member States such as Bulgaria, Estonia, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, have switched part of their public pension 
schemes into private funded schemes. Typically, this provision is statutory but the insurance 
policy is made between the individual and the pension fund.  
In most Member States, the core of the pension system is based on the statutory earnings-
related old-age pension schemes. At the same time, the public pension system often provides 
also a minimum-guaranteed pension to those who do not qualify for the earnings-related 
scheme or have accrued only a small earnings-related pension. Minimum-guarantee pensions 
are usually means-tested and are provided either by a specific minimum pension scheme or 
through a general social assistance scheme. In a few Member States, notably in Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Ireland, the public pension system provides in the first instance a flat-rate 
pension, which can be supplemented by earnings-related private occupational pension 
schemes.  
The type of benefits provided by the public pension systems differ across countries. Most 
pension schemes provide not only old-age pensions but also early retirement, disability and 
survivors’ pensions. Some countries, however, have specific schemes for some of these 
benefit types; in particular, some do not consider disability benefits as pensions (despite the 
fact that they are granted for long periods), and in some cases they are covered by the sickness 
insurance scheme.  
The financing method of the pension systems also differ across countries. Most public 
pension schemes are financed on a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) basis, whereby contribution 
revenues are used for the payments of current pensions. In most countries, minimum 
guarantee pensions are covered by general taxes. Earnings-related schemes are often 
subsidised to varying degrees from general government funds. Some specific schemes, 
notably public sector employees’ pensions sometime do not constitute a well identified 
pension scheme but, instead, disbursements for pensions appear directly as expenditure in the 
government budget. On the other hand, some predominantly PAYG pension schemes have 
statutory requirements for partial pre-funding and, in view of the increasing pension 
expenditure, many governments have started to collect reserve funds for their public pension 
schemes.  
While occupational and private pension schemes are usually funded, the degree of their 
funding relative to the pension promises may differ, due to the fact that future pension 
benefits can be related either to the salary and career length (defined-benefit system) or to 
paid contributions (defined-contribution system). 
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Table 1 - Pension schemes coverage in the 2009 Ageing Report  
Occupatio
nal 
pension 
scheme
Old-age 
pensions
Early 
retirement 
pensions
Disability 
pensions
Survivors' 
pensions
Mandatory 
private 
scheme
Voluntary 
Pension 
scheme
BE ER ER
ER (wage 
earner);   
FR (self-
employed)
ER V* X V*
M young 
(1960)
 M* (prof)
CZ ER ER ER ER X X V*
DK FR & MT V FR FR* V X V
DE ER ER ER ER V* X V*
EE
FR 
(before 
1999); ER 
(after)
X
FR 
(before 
1999); ER 
(after)
FR 
(before 
1999); ER 
(after)
X M - young (1983) V - old*
EL ER ER ER ER X X V*
ES    MT - SA*
ER – priv ; 
FRw - 
pub.
ER – priv ; 
FRw - 
pub.
ER - priv; 
FRw - 
pub.
ER - priv; 
FRw - 
pub.
V - priv; M 
- pub. - V
FR ER ER ER - HC ER V - V*
IE FR MT – FR & SA
SA: MT – 
FR; 
Contributo
ry: FR
SA: MT – 
FR; 
Contributo
ry: FR
M - pub; 
V* - priv X V*
IT ER ER ER ER V* X V*
CY ER ER ER ER M - pub; V* - priv X X
LV ER ER ER ER X
M - young 
(1971); V - 
old
V*
LT ER ER ER FR or ER X V V*
LU    FR - SA* ER ER ER ER V* X V*
HU ER ER ER ER X M - new (1998) V*
MT ER - FR ER
Exists only 
to a minor 
extent*
X V*
NL FR - ER FR M X V*
AT ER ER ER ER M* X V*
PL ER ER ER ER V* M/V V*
PT ER ER ER ER M - prof; V - others X V*
RO ER ER ER ER - M -
SI ER ER ER ER M * - prof; V* - others X V
SK ER ER ER ER X M/V V*
FI ER ER ER ER V* X V*
SE ER ER ER ER V M V
UK ER X ER HC* - V* X V*
NO ER X* ER ER M* X* V*
V*ER / FR ER / FR V*BG MT-SA ER / FR 
ER 
(before 
end 2010 
pensions)
Public pensions
Private pension 
scheme
Minimum pension / 
social allowance 
MT - SA
FR
FR & MT 
MT - SA*
FR
MT
MT
MT - FR & SA
MT & SA
SA*
SA
SA
MT - SA
MT - FR*
SA*
MT - SA*
MT*
MT - SA
SA
FR & MT - SA
FR
MT*
MT - SA
MT
MT
 
Source: Commission services, EPC 
Note: Cells highlighted in grey indicate the schemes not covered by the projection. 
Table refers to the systems covered by the Ageing Report 2009. It should be noted that in the meantime some countries suggested major 
changes to their systems, e.g. Ireland. 
LV: Minimum pensions/social allowance should be: SA&FR, mandatory private scheme: M/V. 
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Key:
MT … Means tested
FR … Flat rate
FRw … Flat rate by wage categories
ER … Earnings related
HC … Partly covered by health care expenditure
SA … Social allowance/assistance
X … Does not exist
V … Voluntary participation in the scheme
M … Mandatory participation in the scheme
* … Is not covered by the projection
public … Public sector employees
private … Private sector employees
new … New labour market entrants
prof … Only for selected professions
other … Other than selected professions
young(X) … Only for people born in year X and after
old … Only for people other than young  
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Annex 2: Indexation rules and sustainability factors 
 
A key determinant of pension expenditure dynamics is the indexation rule, but also automatic 
adjustment mechanisms introduced in some pension systems have impact on future 
expenditure.  
Table 2 - Legal indexation rules in EU Member States  
Occupational 
pension 
scheme
Old-age 
pensions
Early 
retirement 
pensions
Disability 
pensions
Survivors' 
pensions
Mandatory 
private 
scheme
Voluntary 
Pension 
scheme
BE CPI + LSA CPI + LSA CPI + LSA CPI + LSA - - -
BG 50%CPI + 50% NI
50%CPI + 
50% NI 
(before end 
2010 
pensions). 
NR (after 
2010 
pensions)
50%CPI + 
50% NI
50%CPI + 
50% NI NR NR NR
CZ CPI + min 1/3 RI
CPI + min 1/3 
RI
CPI + min 1/3 
RI
CPI + min 1/3 
RI - - -
DK NI NI NI NI - - -
DE NI + sust NI + sust NI + sust NI + sust - - -
EE 80% CPI + 20% NI
80% CPI + 
20% NI
80% CPI + 
20% NI
80% CPI + 
20% NI - - -
EL NR NR NR NR - - -
ES CPI CPI CPI CPI - - -
FR CPI CPI CPI CPI - - -
IE NR NR NR NR NR - pub - -
IT CPI - size CPI - size CPI - size CPI - size - - -
CY Basic: NI; Suppl.: CPI
Basic: NI; 
Suppl.: CPI
Basic: NI; 
Suppl.: CPI
Basic: NI; 
Suppl.: CPI NI - pub - -
LV CPI + 50% RI CPI + 50% RI CPI + 50% RI CPI + 50% RI - - -
LT NR NR NR NR - - NR
LU
CPI if 
CPI>2.5%  & 
RI re-
exam(2)
CPI if 
CPI>2.5%  & 
RI re-
exam(2)
CPI if 
CPI>2.5%  & 
RI re-
exam(2)
CPI if 
CPI>2.5%  & 
RI re-
exam(2)
- - -
HU 50% CPI + 50% NI
50% CPI + 
50% NI
50% CPI + 
50% NI
50% CPI + 
50% NI -
At least 50% 
CPI + 50% NI -
MT
COLA + NI 
(born before 
1962); 70% 
NI + 30% CPI 
(born after 
1962) 
- COLA
COLA + NI 
(born before 
1962); 70% 
NI + 30% CPI 
(born after 
1962)
- - -
NL NI - NI NI 70% NI & 30% CPI - -
AT CPI CPI CPI CPI - - -
PL CPI + 20% RI CPI + 20% RI CPI + 20% RI CPI + 20% RI - NR NR
PT
CPI + GDP 
partially (size 
and GDP)
CPI + GDP 
partially (size 
and GDP)
CPI + GDP 
partially (size 
and GDP)
CPI + GDP 
partially (size 
and GDP)
CPI for DB 
1st pillar and  
re-exam(1) 
for the other 
plans
- -
RO RI RI RI RI - NR -
SI NI and sust NI and sust NI and sust NI and sust NR NR NR
SK 50% CPI + 50% NI
50% CPI + 
50% NI
50% CPI + 
50% NI
50% CPI + 
50% NI - NR -
FI 80% CPI + 20%NI + sust
80% CPI + 
20%NI + sust
80% CPI + 
20%NI + sust
80% CPI + 
20%NI + sust - - -
SE NI + sust NI + sust NI + CPI NI + CPI - - -
UK CPI; NI as of 2012 - - CPI - - -
NO NI - NI NI - - -
CPI
CPI
NI
NI
CPI + GDP 
partially 
(GDP)
RI
In line with 
pensions
NR
2/3 COLA
NI
CPI
CPI + 20% RI
CPI + 50% RI
NR
CPI if 
CPI>2.5%  & 
RI re-
exam(2)
-
CPI
NR
CPI or fixed 
in nominal 
terms
NI
Minimum 
pension / 
social 
allowance 
CPI + LSA 
NR
LEGAL INDEXATION
Public pensions Private pension scheme
50%CPI + 
50% NI
NR
NI
In line with 
pensions & re-
exam(5)
80% CPI + 
20% NI
CPI
 
Source: 2009 Ageing Report 
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Key:
NR … No rule exists
RI … Real income growth
NI … Nominal income growth
GDP … GDP growth
CPI … CPI inflation
LE … Adjustment to life expectancy.
LSA … Living standard adjustment
COLA … Adjustmentd to cost of living
size … Adjusted by a pension size
sust … Additional adjustment due to other mechanisms such as a sustainability factor,
balancing mechanism, life expectancy, value of a pension point,
maintenance of relativity between means-tested and contributory pension, etc.
re-exam(X) … Reexamination of pension value every X years
min … At least  
Note: Some changes have been introduced since the release of the 2009 Ageing Report as follows.  
Hungary: Public pensions are indexed to CPI and, depending on GDP growth, also NI component If the real 
GDP growth is 3%, 100% CPI shall be applied; in case of higher GDP, the proportion of NI component 
gradually increases, but no more than 50% (if real GDP growth exceeds the 5%).  
Romania: Public pensions are indexed to nominal income growth (100% NI). 
Latvia: minimum pension/social allowance: CPI + 50% RI, but FR – NR; other public pensions: CPI + 50% RI 
UK: The final column ('voluntary pension scheme') entry for the UK should read 'the lesser of RPI and 2.5%'. 
Voluntary private sector DB schemes are required to index the pensions of early leavers and pensioners by RPI 
up to a maximum of 2.5% per annum. In the event of deflation there is no negative indexation and the nominal 
value of benefits is maintained. 
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Annex 3: Greater role for pre-funding of pensions1 
 
Greater pre-funding, in one form or another, has been a popular policy response by Member 
States to the demographic challenge. The main reasons behind introduction of pre-funding 
have been to reduce the burden of pension expenditure for future working population and to 
give people the idea about the cost of pension promises at an early stage of work careers. 
However, it is important to note that pay-as-you-go (PAYG) is and will remain the most 
important element in overall pension provision for most European citizens.  
As illustrated in Figure 1, privately managed funded schemes are not entirely mature in the 
majority of Member States where they exist. Usually a higher share of active population is 
covered than in the population aged 65 and more. Some pre-funding has traditionally been an 
important element of the overall pension system only in certain EU countries (notably in IE, 
NL, SE, UK and DK plus FI with its long established reserve fund).  
Figure 1 - Privately managed funded pensions coverage in selected EU Member States, 2008 
0
20
40
60
80
100
0 20 40 60 80 100
Current pensioners as a % of 65+
C
ov
er
ag
e 
of
 a
ct
iv
e 
m
em
be
rs
 a
s 
a 
%
 o
ac
tiv
e 
po
pu
la
tio
n
BG
FI
NL*
EE CZ
PL
ES
SI
RO
DE
PT
UK*
BE
ATIT
LU*
DKEL
 
Source: OECD GPS database 
Note: *-2007, Maximum coverage is set at 100% for countries where more than total active population is 
covered 
Private pension plan according to the OECD: a pension plan administered by an institution other than general 
government. Private pension plans may be administered directly by a private sector employer acting as the plan 
sponsor, a private pension fund or a private sector provider. Private pension plans may complement or substitute 
for public pension plans. In some countries, these may include plans for public sector workers. 
                                                 
1  
In case of Belgium data only include autonomous pension funds.  
In case of Denmark the split between active and passive members is provided only for company pension funds. 
Company pension plans held in insurance companies or in banks (which represent the biggest part of 
occupational pension plans) and the ATP plan are not covered. 
Data from Ireland come from the IAPF asset allocation survey (Irish Association of Pension Funds). This 
survey is based an a sample of financial institutions involved in pension fund asset management and is 
complemented by the largest Irish pension funds. 
In the case of Germany, data only cover Pensionskassen and Pensionsfonds (German IORPs that fall under the 
supervision of BaFin). 
Data for Finland cover the mandatory pension plans. Even if they are part of the social security system, they are 
included in the OECD statistics as these plans are partially funded. 
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In case of Belgium, if members of both pension funds and group life insurance schemes are included, the ratio of 
active members as a % of active population stands at 56.5% in 2008, while the ratio of current pensioners as a % 
of 65+ at 4.5%.  
 
Figure 2 demonstrates that contributions to privately managed funded pensions as a share of 
GDP are usually higher in countries with high coverage of active population and in countries 
with mature schemes. Countries with traditionally important and mature privately managed 
funded pensions also have higher assets as a proportion of their GDP. Nevertheless, as the 
schemes will mature, the share of their assets in GDP will increase and long-term projections 
reveal that funded pensions will play greater role in future pensioners' income than they do 
today in a number of Member States.  
 
Figure 2 - Privately managed funded pension coverage and contributions in the EU, 2008 
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Source: OECD GPS database 
Note: *-2007, Maximum coverage is set at 100% for countries where more than total active population is 
covered 
For Belgium contributions as a % of GDP represented 1.7% in 2008 if both pension funds and group life 
insurance schemes are included. 
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Annex 4: Labour market developments 2000-2008 
 
During the last decade, labour markets of the EU-27 have seen a positive development 
overall, in particular between 2004 and 2008. Since the beginning of the Lisbon Strategy, 
considerable progress had been made in EU labour markets before the crisis in financial 
markets deepened sharply in autumn 2008 - the overall employment rate had risen by close to 
4 percentage points (pps), reaching 65.9% in 2008 (vs 62.1% in 2000), reflecting a rise in the 
total number of people in employment2 of around 19 million. The employment rates for 
women and older workers in particular showed considerable progress, reaching 59.1% and 
45.6% respectively in 2008. 
Compared to 2000, by 2008 the overall employment rate in the EU-27 has risen 3.8 
percentage points, the female employment rate 5.5 pps, and that for older workers 8.8 pps. As 
a result, the gaps relative to the Lisbon targets were respectively 4.1, 0.9 and 4.4 pps in 2008. 
However, one should bear in mind that the targets were originally set when the EU comprised 
just 15 Member States. With regard to that configuration progress towards the targets has 
been more substantial. The gaps in 2008 were a more limited 2.7, -0.43 and 2.6 pps 
respectively. As a result, the mechanical impact of the two recent enlargements has been to 
reduce average EU employment rates by around 1.4-1.8 percentage points, depending on the 
specific target. 
Figure 3 – Overall, female and older workers employment rates in EU-27, 2000-2008, in % 
Overall, female and older workers employment rates 
in EU-27 2000-2008 in %
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Source: Eurostat, LFS annual data. 
 
The greatest progress in employment has been achieved among women and older workers. 
Between 2000 and 2008, 39 % of the net creation of employment was contributed by women 
aged 25-54 and a further 38 % by 55-64 year olds (European Commission 2009a, Table 3). 
 
                                                 
2 National concept based on Eurostat LFS data. 
3 A negative gap meaning that the target had been exceeded.  
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Table 3 - Developments in overall, female and older worker's employment rates EU-27 2000-2008 
  EU-27   EU-25   EU-15  
 2000 2008 Change 2000 2008 Change 2000 2008 Change 
Overall ER (%) 62.1 65.9 3.8 62.2 66.3 4.1 63.2 67.3 4.1 
Female ER (%) 53.6 59.1 5.5 53.5 59.4 5.9 53.9 60.4 6.5 
Older worker's ER (%) 36.8 45.6 8.8 36.4 45.7 9.3 37.5 47.4 9.9 
Source: Eurostat, LFS annual data 
 
Figure 4 - Employment rates in the EU-27, 2000-2009, 2nd quarters, in % 
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Source: Eurostat, LFS quarterly data on 2nd quarter 
 
The overall impact of the crisis on labour markets still remains to be seen. While some 
Member States have seen much worse outcomes than others, developments since mid-2008 
are marked by falling demand for new workers (around -30%), employment contraction (-
1.9% = 4.3 million jobs), and rising unemployment especially among groups already in a 
relatively weaker labour market situation before the crisis (young people, low-skilled, 
migrants). Older workers have not been at particular risk of losing their job due to the crisis 
so far, but they face substantial difficulties in becoming re-employed.4 While employment 
rates fell between the second quarters of 2008 and 2009 for younger people and especially for 
men, the rates further increased for older workers. 
 
                                                 
4 Draft Joint Employment Report 2009/2010  
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Figure 5 – Level and change in employment rate of 55-64 year old workers in Member States, 2000-2009 
Level and change of employment rate of 55-64 year olds
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Source: Eurostat, LFS quarterly data on 2nd quarter 
 
Figure 55 compares the level of the employment rate in 2000 with the subsequent change of 
the employment rate between 2000 and 2009 in percentage points. Between 2000 and 2009 on 
average the increase was higher in countries that had a low employment rate, thus leading to a 
slight convergence of rates in this period. In the second quarter of 2009, already 11 countries 
reached the goal of an employment rate of 50 % (SE, EE, DK, LV, UK, DE, CY, FI, NL, LT, 
IE, marked by a ●).  
 
 
                                                 
5 France is not included because of missing data for the year 2000. In the 2nd quarter of 2009, the employment 
rate for 55-64 year-olds in France was 39.4%. 
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Annex 5: Future adequacy of pensions measured by 
Theoretical Replacement Rates 
 
I. Introduction 
Theoretical Replacement Rates are defined as the level of pension income the first year after 
retirement as a percentage of individual earnings at the moment of take-up of pensions. 
Theoretical replacement rates are calculated for an assumed hypothetical worker, who in the 
so-called "base case" has a given earnings and career profile (male, earnings of average wage 
constant over his fulltime 40 years career, retiring at 65, etc) and a corresponding affiliation to 
pension schemes (i.e. the most general schemes for private sector employees). In the so-called 
"variant cases" the key assumptions of the base case are changed, once at a time, (for 
example, variant earnings profiles or length of contributory period) in order to illustrate how 
the replacement rates vary for different departures from the main assumptions, and thereby to 
study the effects of the reforms that entail changes on the related key parameters. 
Replacement rates also rely on specific assumptions on the key economic and demographic 
parameters that are relevant for the calculation of future earnings and benefit entitlements. As 
opposed to other adequacy measures, such as the gross average replacement rate, theoretical 
replacement rate calculations assume a constant steady state of the macroeconomic 
assumptions, thus isolating the effects of the pension legislations on an individual's pension. 
The theoretical replacement rate calculations take into consideration social security 
contributions to statutory and supplementary pension schemes or funds. Taxes and means-
tested social benefits are included in the calculations. The gross replacement rate is defined 
according to the pre-taxed income (after employer contributions, but including employee 
contributions). The net replacement rate is calculated as net of income taxes and employee 
contributions6. 
Current replacement rates for 2006 describe the situation of people who retire today, while 
prospective replacement rates for 2046 describe the pension income of people retiring in the 
future thus also reflecting the effects of eventual pension reforms7. Results for 2006 present 
the pension outcome under current legislation (enacted by 2006), including transitional rules 
to be implemented gradually that may be legislated in enacted reforms. This includes the 
currently legislated indexation rules for different benefits. The calculations do not reflect 
reforms that can have been decided since 2006. The calculations for 2046 typically reflect 
reformed pension systems in full maturity. In this way the calculations allow for an 
assessment of recent pension reforms on adequacy of pensions, taking into account changes 
that have been decided in many countries as a result of recent reforms8. 
Annex 16 presents summary charts on the levels of net and gross theoretical replacement rates 
of the EU Member States according to the current and prospective calculations for 2006 and 
                                                 
6 For more detailed information see the  report "Updates of current and prospective theoretical pension 
replacement rates 2006-2046",  
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?langId=en&catId=752&newsId=551&furtherNews=yes 
7 While the data and information here still refers to 2006 and 2046 (the current most recent update of theoretical 
replacement rates), the attempt will be to provide these figures and analysis for 2008 and 2048, once the ongoing 
exercise of updating and validating these figures is finalised. 
8 It should be noted however, that the point at which we measure current theoretical replacement rates (currently, 
2006) already contains many reforms, therefore the exercise of comparing theoretical replacement rates 2046 – 
2006 cannot be understood as reflecting a straightforward assessment of the situation post – pre reforms that 
have taken place over the last decade. Since pension reforms occur more or less constantly, this would actually 
happen for any point of time at which we could try to measure theoretical replacement rates.  
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2046 and a break-down into individual components of statutory and complementary 
provisions. However, comparability of replacement rate levels across countries is not clear-
cut. In order not to misinterpret the results it is vital to consider theoretical replacement rates 
with information on representativeness and the assumptions, as they are calculated for a 
hypothetical worker. The choice of specific common assumptions about the hypothetical 
worker used for the calculation, such as the age of retirement and the length of the 
contributory period before retirement, inevitably imply that only a share of individuals are 
actually represented by this career scenario. 
The base case, for example, is chosen in order to reflect as closely as possible current actual 
situations and institutional frameworks. However, given the diversity of situations across 
Member States, the base case may not necessarily be representative of workers in all Member 
States and therefore, theoretical replacement rates need to be analysed in the light of 
background information aimed at showing in particular how "representative" the hypothetical 
worker is in a specific Member State. For example, in the calculations a forty year career is 
typically calculated with a person entering the labour market at the age of 25 and retiring at 
65. The fallback with these calculations is that the replacement rates for countries with a 
higher or lower legislated retirement age than that which is assumed can mean that the work 
incentives in the system may be over or under estimated depending on how they are 
legislated. 
Consequently, comparability between Member States of current and projected replacement 
rates depends on the degree to which the commonly defined individual case is representative 
in different Member States. This varies considerably across Member States, impairing the 
direct comparability of the results based on actual replacement rate levels.  
Therefore, the analysis of theoretical replacement rates in this section focus on differences in 
theoretical replacement rates over time or between different profiles, to assess different 
reforms, rather than on levels' comparison across countries. Also the interpretation of the TRR 
over time has to consider that it is a theoretical case, not matched by the reality of increasing 
average careers.  
II. Changes in Theoretical Replacement Rates  
First, updates of the calculations for an agreed upon average earner profile, the so-called base 
case are presented and analysed for the period 2006-2046. Later on, the other career and 
income profiles (variant cases) with a comparison to the base case are analysed. 
 II. 1. Base case scenario 
Given the assumptions described in the previous section for the calculations of theoretical 
replacement rates in the basecase, 11 Member States display results where reforms of 
statutory schemes would lead to a decrease of replacement rates between 2006 and 2046, for a 
worker with average earnings retiring at 65 after 40 years (see Figure 1 below, displaying the 
change in replacement rates from the current situation to the prospective situation). This is 
most probably a reflection of reforms that have lowered future benefit levels at a fixed 
retirement age in order to cope with increasing longevity and the expenditure it would 
otherwise entail. As a result many Member States have also proceeded to increase incentives 
to work longer.  
Some of the factors that may influence the downward evolution of replacement rates for some 
Member States observed in Figure 1 are summarised below: 
Most Member States have statutory pension schemes providing earnings-related pensions. 
Benefits under these pension schemes are related to earnings either during a specified number 
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of years during the career, or as is increasingly common practice, during the entire length of 
the career. Several countries have extended — or are still in the process of extending — the 
period of an individual’s earnings history that is used for calculating the pension entitlement 
in the statutory pension schemes (e.g. AT, BG, CZ, ES, FR, HU, PT, FI, IT, RO). Thus, 
instead of using the years of highest earnings towards the end of the career for the pension 
benefit calculation, earnings during a much longer period or even the entire career (e.g. DE, 
PL, SE, RO) are taken into consideration. This change will usually lead to lower replacement 
rates, particularly if accrued entitlements are not fully adjusted for (nominal) wage growth.  
Pension levels can also be lowered through adjustments in the pension formula used to 
calculate benefits. One significant development has been the introduction of a demographic 
adjustment factor. For countries which have introduced life expectancy adjustment factors in 
their statutory pension systems (e.g. DE, AT, FI, FR, IT, PL, PT, SE), this can translate into a 
decrease of theoretical replacement rates. Thereby, in order to keep income replacement rate 
constant, they provide incentives for people to postpone their retirement in accordance with 
rising life expectancy and offer opportunities for achieving adequate pension levels (see 
below). 
Increasing the retirement age can also result in falling replacement rates where a retirement 
age of 65 is assumed in the calculations. For instance, in DE the rise of the legal retirement 
age from 65 in 2006 to 67 in 2046 gives deductions of 3.6% per year of early retirement 
before the age of 67, and explains some of the fall in theoretical replacement rates from the 
statutory pension scheme, when the retirement age is assumed at 65. 
For other group of Member States there seem to be no significant changes in their 
replacement rates between 2006 and 2046. And a last group of Member States may actually 
observe their replacement rates rise as a result of recent reforms that would be fully in place 
by 2046. 
Figure 6 - Change in the TRR between 2006 and 2046, the "base-case" scenario9 
Change in TRR in pp, 2046-2006
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Source: TRR report 
                                                 
9 In case of HU, the changes in gross replacement rate are partially caused by a methodological change. As from 
2013, benefits will be calculated on the basis of gross earnings and will become taxable, thus the gross 
replacement rate also includes the effect of a foreseen change in taxation rules. 
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II.2. Variant cases of different earning profiles 
Figure 7 shows changes in prospective (2046) net theoretical replacement rates for: 
a) Low income earner (2/3 average wage), compared with average earner. 
b) High wage earner (linear increasing earnings profile beginning at 100% of the average, 
ending at 200% of the average) compared with average earner. 
c) High wage earner (linear increasing earnings profile beginning at 80% of the average, 
ending at 120% of the average) compared with average earner. 
d) Concave earning profile (increasing from 75% to 105% of average wage) compared with 
average earner. 
Figure 7 - Differences in net TRR between variant cases of earning profiles compared to the average 
earner ("base-case") in 2046 
Differences in Net TRR between variant cases of earning profiles compared to the 
average earner (basecase). Projections calculations for 2046
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Source: TRR report 
Figure 8 shows changes in net TRR between 2006 and 2046 for: 
a) Average earner retiring at age 65 after 40 years career. 
b) Low income earner (2/3 average wage) retiring at age 65 after 40 years career. 
b) High wage earner (linear increasing earnings profile beginning at 100% of the average, 
ending at 200% of the average) retiring at age 65 after 40 years career. 
For workers with low earnings, mandatory schemes may tend to have a more significant role 
in the replacement income. Gross replacement rates are significantly higher (4 pp. or higher) 
for low income workers than average earners in some Member States (CZ, DK, EE, IE, LT, 
LU, NL, SE, UK) (Figure 2). 
For the remaining Member States the difference is small with only a few Member States with 
lower gross replacement rates for low earners. This reflects the fact that most countries 
attempt to protect low income workers from old-age poverty especially in the statutory 
pension schemes.  
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When studying net replacement rates, however, some Member States display a lower result 
for low income earner compared with average income earners (CY, HU, AT, PT, RO, SI and 
SK). This is because the effect of taxes and social security contributions on net replacement 
rates for low earners can be higher than for workers higher up the earnings scale. Low-income 
workers typically pay less in taxes and contributions than those on average earnings. 
However, in many cases, retirement incomes for those with lower earnings are at a level that 
does not allow them to benefit from income-tax reliefs (allowances, credits, etc). This means 
that in some cases low income earners may pay a larger portion of their gross pension in taxes 
as compared with an average earner. 
Regarding the evolution replacement rates between 2006 and 2046 (Figure 3), the decline of 
the theoretical replacement rate between 2006 and 2046 is in many cases of a comparable 
magnitude (as expressed in percentage points) for a low wage earner and the average one. As 
replacement rates are generally higher for that type of career, this indicates that the decline in 
relative disposable income is projected to be lower for more modest workers. 
Figure 8 - Differences in net TRR between 2006 and 2046 for different earning profiles 
Differences in Net TRR between 2006 and 2046 for different earning profiles
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Source: TRR report 
However, for some Member States, the evolution of theoretical replacement rates appears to 
be very significantly less favourable for lower wages than for average wages (EE, SK, IT, EL 
and SE), which may reflect in some cases short transition periods associated to the 
introduction of a funded tier in the statutory scheme. More generally, it can be noted that a 
reinforcement of the link between contributions and benefits can result into a flatter profile of 
the evolution of replacement rates according to initial levels, which could translate into 
significant declines of replacement rates for more modest pensioners.  
On the other extreme, studying the case of a higher than average wage earner is important in 
order to study the role of private pension provision which is often more pertinent in the 
income replacement for those with higher earnings. It also shows the restrictions of earnings 
ceilings that often exist in statutory pension schemes on replacement rates, implying that the 
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formula of pension benefits can be both progressive (lower replacement rates for higher 
incomes) and have redistributive elements. 
In almost all Member States those with a higher earnings profile display significantly lower 
replacement rates compared with average earners in all Member States (Figure 2). This less 
favourable situation for high wage earners in Member States reflects the progressive nature of 
the formula of pension benefits. Furthermore, in many pension schemes the length of earnings 
history used in the benefit calculation is being extended, where earnings from more years are 
used to calculate the pension. This is often a relatively unfavourable development for those 
with increasing wage profiles and high departing salaries. 
As compared to the base case, the evolution over time of theoretical replacement rates is in 
most cases lower (as expressed in percentage points) for a worker with an ascending wage 
profile (from 100% to 200% of the average wage) than for a flat wage profile at the level of 
the average wage (Figure 3). While in most Member States the evolution is not very different 
than in the base case (difference of about one or two percentage point), in some Members 
States, the evolution is less favourable of between 5 and 10 percentage points (in net terms, in 
DE, HU, IT, IE, LV, MT, NL, PL, PT, SI, UK). 
II.3. Variant case of worker ten years after retirement 
The basic definition of theoretical replacement rates reflects the income replacement at the 
time of retirement. But adequacy is not just about replacement levels at the time of retirement 
and pension take-up but also about how the value of benefits relative to prices and wages is 
maintained over time, especially considering that the retirement period is currently likely to 
last for more than 15 years for men as longevity increases. 
Figure 9 – Difference in net and gross TRRs for a pensioner ten years after retirement compared to net 
and gross TRRs of the year of retirement ("base-case"), calculations for 2046 
Difference in Net and Gross TRRs for a pensioner ten years 
after retirement compared to Net and Gross TRRs of the year of 
retirement (basecase). Prospective calculations for 2046
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Source: TRR report 
Indexation allows pensions to keep a certain value over time, ensuring maintained of 
standards of living for a group that typically cannot affect their income level in the years 
following retirement. Historically, pensions have tended to be indexed to inflation, which is 
typically lower than the development of nominal average earnings, as is assumed in our 
exercise. While protecting retirees from inflation, less than indexation to earnings means that 
the living standards of a pensioner will drop over time relative to the rest of the population 
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and pensions in payment most often lag behind the evolution of wages. This can translate into 
significant declines of the level of theoretical replacement rates during the period of 
retirement. 
Figure 9 shows, for a pensioner retiring in 2046, the difference between prospective net and 
gross theoretical replacement rates ten years after retirement (ie 2056) compared to those 
ratios at the year of retirement (2046). 
According to the calculations, in all but a few Member States (e.g. LU, NL, SI) replacement 
rates fall significantly in all schemes ten years into retirement. This clearly reflects the wide 
use of less than earnings indexation in Member States, even in DC schemes once they have 
been converted into an annuity. 
II.4. Variant cases of different retirement ages 
II.4.1. A female base case worker 
According to current legislation the retirement age in 2046 for women will be different to that 
for men in some Member States. This would mean that the possible standard-career is often 
shorter for women due to a lower legislated retirement age (BG, IT, LT, PL, RO)10. The 
calculation for the variant case for a female base case worker looks at the differences in 
prospective replacement rates between men and women based on the lower retirement age and 
a consequently shorter contributory period for women in comparison to men in these 
countries. In these calculations retirement is assumed at the legislated retirement age for both 
men and women and not the assumed retirement age of 65 used in the base case calculations. 
The implication of this is that the length of career differs between men and women according 
to the statutory retirement age. Probable differences in average earnings that may exist 
between men and women are not considered here. 
Figure 10 - Differences in net and gross TRR for women compared with men average earners retiring at 
the legislated retirement age (where different) in 2046 
Differences in Net and Gross TRR for women compared with men average 
earners retiring at the legislated retirement age (where different). 
Prospective Calculations for 2046
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Source: TRR report 
                                                 
10 The pension eligibility age is also different for men and women in SI, but the contributory requirements are 
adjusted in a manner that women receive the same gross replacement rate as men despite retiring two years 
earlier at age 61. The calculations have, therefore, not been carried out for SI.   
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The gross and net replacement rate results are lower for women than for men in all Member 
States. The most notable gender differential in gross replacement rate is observed for IT 
(around 18 pp.) and PL (around 15 pp.) which both have NDC systems with actuarial 
reductions of the pension the earlier it is retrieved. The lower replacement rates are a result of 
women retiring earlier than men. In IT, for example, the calculations for women present 
retirement at age 60 with 35 years of work seniority as compared with retirement at 65 with 
40 years seniority for men. It is however important to note that in IT women may continue to 
work age of 65 or beyond. The difference in the results between men and women in BG and 
LT are lower reflecting better protection for shorter careers for women. 
II.4.2. Longer and shorter careers 
In the ISG calculations a forty year career is typically calculated with a person entering the 
labour market at the age of 25 and retiring at 65. Results have shown a decline in future 
pension levels and the subsequent theoretical replacement at a given pension age. This reflects 
that reforms of statutory pensions aim at meeting the challenge caused by increases in life 
expectancy by lowering pension levels if individuals in the future still retire at the same age as 
today. To compensate for this decline most countries have incorporated incentives to prolong 
working life into their pension systems. 
Figure 11 – Difference in net TRR percentage points for an average earner working until the age of 63 or 
67 (ie 38 or 42 contributory years) compared with working until 65 (ie 40 years "base-case" career) in 
2046 
Difference in Net TRR percentage points for an average earner working until the 
age of 63 or 67 (ie 38 or 42 contributory years) compared with working until 65 (ie 
40 years career - basecase). Prospective Calculations, 2046
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Source: TRR report 
Many of these incentives take the form of reductions for early retirement or bonuses for later 
retirement. These may be carried out in an actuarial manner often based on remaining life 
expectancy and through bonuses and penalties fixed by legislation. Other incentives to work 
more and longer are generated by increasing the contributory period in pension systems and 
strengthening the link between pensions and contributions. Such reforms are significant as 
prolonging working lives does not only entail leaving the labour market later but also entering 
it earlier and minimizing long career breaks. 
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In these variants the dynamics of work incentives can be studied by comparing a base case 
worker who retires at 65 with one that retires at 63 or at 67 thus decreasing and increasing the 
seniority of the worker. Figure below illustrates the potential economic consequences of 
retiring at ages 63 or 67 instead of age 65. 
Calculations show that in most Member States delaying retirement results in higher 
theoretical replacement rates, while earlier retirement usually results in lower replacement 
rates. In all but a few Member States the increments in pensions for prolonged working lives 
are higher than the fall in replacement rates with earlier retirement. 
II. 5 Variant cases with career breaks 
It is an interesting development to study to what extent social protection systems not only 
protect the current loss of income due to care responsibilities or in the event of 
unemployment, but also protect future incomes in the form of pension entitlements. This is 
becoming increasingly important as the number of contributory years needed for a full 
pension is being extended in many Member States. 
II.5.1. Career break for childcare years 
In many Member States, absences from the labour market for childcare are typically protected 
to a certain extent for the first years of absence and usually the protection is equally spread 
over these years. In this exercise replacement rates are shown for women. Figure 12 shows 
the differences in prospective (2046) net theoretical replacement rates for a female average 
earner who makes a career break during 0, 1, 2 or 3 years for childcare compared to one with 
no children.  
Figure 12 – Differences in net TRR for a female average earner who makes a career break during 0, 1, 2 
or 3 years for childcare compared to one with no children, in 2046 
 
Source: TRR report 
In most Member States, childcare years do not give or reduce pension credits if there are no 
years of absence from the labour market. DE, FR, and IT have systems which provide extra 
pension entitlements following the birth of a child, which means that even if no actual period 
of childcare leave is taken, the pension will still be greater than for women with no children 
(in FR the increase in pensions would be greater with a third child).  
In a few Member States, pension rights for up to three years of absence are so well protected 
that calculations show insignificant or no drop in replacement rates during a career break of 
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up to three years (e.g. CZ, ES, LU, MT, FI) (In BE there is essentially no drop during career 
break of up to two years).  
In all other Member States, child care years result in a drop in replacement rates compared 
with a woman with no children, from the first year of absence. This can be due to the features 
of the pension system where the link between the contributory periods and the pension where 
non-contributory years for child care are not taken up entirely. 
II.5.2. Career break for unemployment years 
Figure 8 shows the differences in prospective (2046) net theoretical replacement rates for a 
man who enters the labour market at 25 and leaves at the legislated retirement age for men 
and a man with the same profile but with career breaks of 1, 2, 3 years due to unemployment. 
In most Member States unemployment breaks lead to drops in replacement rates, showing 
bigger drops the longer the break. In most Member States, the legislated period of entitlement 
for unemployment breaks does not stretch out for three years, resulting in a bigger drop in 
replacement rates during the second or third year of unemployment. In extreme cases these 
become non-income and non-contributory years. 
In most countries unemployment results in a loss of pension entitlements and affects the 
prospective replacement rate. The results show a decrease of less than 4 pp. in most Member 
States for three years of unemployment. This implies a considerable protection of pension 
entitlements in the unemployment benefit system in most Member States. In other Member 
States the drop in replacement rates can amount to 6 pp. or more (e.g. SK, RO, FI) bringing 
the adequacy of protection of pension entitlements during unemployment into question, which 
has to be balanced with the financial incentives for individuals to return to the labour market. 
Figure 13 – Differences in net TRR for an average earner retiring at the statutory retirement age with 1, 
2, or 3 years career break for unemployment at the end of career compared with no break ("base-case") 
in 2046 
Differences in Net TRR for an average earner retiring at the statutory retirment age 
with 1, 2 or 3 years career break for unemployment compared with no break 
(basecase). Prospective Calculations for 2046
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Source: TRR report 
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The analysis of variant cases is to be extended with the new cases to be simulated under the 
ongoing update and validation exercise for 2008-2048: higher/lower wage growth and 
higher/lower rate of returns.  
Figure 14 - Net and gross TRR in 2006 and 2046 
Net and Gross Theoretical Replacement Rates, 2006 and 2046 
(sorted by ascending Net TRR in 2006)
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Figure 15 – Breakdown of gross TRR: statutory and occupational pensions 
Breakdown of Gross Theoretical Replacement Rates: Statutory 
pensions (including statutory funded schemes) and 
occupational pensions
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Annex 6: Recent pension reforms in Member States  
 
Recent pension reforms incorporated in the 2009 Ageing Report projections11 
 
Belgium 
The standard retirement age for women has been increased gradually from 63 in 2003 to 64 in 2006 and 65 in 
2009. Retirement age remains flexible from the age of 60 for men and women, provided that a 35-year career 
condition is satisfied. The “older unemployment scheme”, reformed in 2002, will keep having an impact on 
participation rates between 50 and 58. 
The law concerning the “Solidarity Pact between Generations” has come into force in 2006. It provided a series 
of measures to increase participation in the labour market. The statutory age for the early retirement 
(“prépension”) scheme embedded in the unemployment insurance has been raised from 58 to 60 and the 
eligibility conditions (career length) have been made more restrictive. Conditions for entering this scheme before 
the statutory age (“prépensions” for labour market reasons) have also become tighter. Staying at work after the 
age of 62 is now rewarded by a specific supplement in the pension formula (“pension bonus”). Finally, a 
structural mechanism for linking benefits to prosperity has been introduced. 
Czech Republic  
Before the pension reform in 2003, men retired at the age of 60 and women at 53-57, depending on the number 
of children (one year less per child). Since January 2004 with modification of the retirement age from August 
2008, the age of retirement is increased constantly over time (2 months per year for men and 4 months per year 
for women) to reach 65 years for men and 62-65 for women (still depending on the number of children) born in 
1968 and later. Bonus for later retirement is 1.5% of person’s calculation base for every additional completed 90 
calendar days. Early retirements are subject to penalization, which is 0.9% of person’s calculation base for every 
period of 90 calendar days before the statutory retirement age up to 720 days and 1.5% from the 721st day. But 
resulting earnings related component must not be lower than 770 CZK (approx. 28 Euro). 
Denmark 
Denmark introduced in 2006 a major reform package known as the "Welfare Agreement". This reform package 
affects mainly younger than age 48 at the end of 2006. It reverses the 2004 decision to lower retirement age from 
67 to 65. It also increases early retirement (VERB) from age 60 to age 62 between 2019 and 2022 with a 
minimum contribution period of 30 years instead of 25 for taking a VERB. The normal retirement age is 
increased from age 65 to 67 between 2024 and 2027. Finally it indexes the retirement ages to the average life 
expectancy of 60-years old from 2025. 
Germany 
Since the early nineties a series of major reforms have been passed, aiming at the financial and social 
sustainability of the public pension scheme. Highlighting the most important reform steps, the reform process 
began in the mid of the nineties with the increase of the statutory retirement age to the age of 65 years and the 
introduction of deductions on early retirement (3,6 % per year) accompanied with a bonus for deferred 
retirement (6,0 % per year). Secondly, at the beginning of this decade, a comprehensive promotion of second and 
third pillar pension schemes (Riester pension) by subsidising voluntary contributions was introduced. The aim of 
those reforms was to compensate the envisaged reduction of benefits in the statutory pension scheme by second 
and third pillar pensions. Thirdly, in 2005 the pension adjustment formula was augmented by a sustainability 
factor, which adjusts statutory pension payments to population dynamics, whereby the extent of the adjustment 
is determined by the change in the relation of the workforce to the number of retirees.  
The most recent major reform took place in 2007. Though the transition process of increasing the retirement age 
to 65 years is not yet fully completed, a further increase of the statutory retirement age to the age of 67 was 
legislated (the age of retirement will be increased one month each year from 2012 on to 2024, then 2 months 
each year until the age of 67 years will be reached by 2029). The first aim of this reform was postponing the 
retirement age and thus decreasing the future financial burden. Secondly, the reform will partially compensate 
the expected decline of the workforce due to population ageing. Therefore, the increase of the retirement age is 
accompanied by the so-called "Initiative 50 plus" which aims to increase participation rates of older workers by a 
large range of different measures such as the extension of vocational training and the reduction of employment 
                                                 
11 The information was provided by the Members of the EPC and AWG. Detailed information on the national 
pension models is available in European Economy (2009), 2009 Ageing Report: Pension models in EU Member 
States and projection results. 
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barriers for older workers.  
Estonia 
Changes in the PAYG system include raising the retirement age for females to 63 by 2016 and revising the 
benefit formula. Legislation passed in mid-September 2001 set up mandatory individual accounts in the second 
tier (starting operations in mid-2002), while voluntary accounts became the new third tier. 
Spain 
The latest reform of the pension system in 2002 (Law 35/2002) abolished mandatory retirement age (65) in the 
private sector. Workers remaining active after 65 will increase their pension benefit by 2% per year, and both 
employers and employees’ are exempted from paying most social security contributions. For workers age at least 
60, social contributions are reduced by 50%, and this amount is increased by 10% to reach 100% for those aged 
65. Early retirement is possible from 61 year old, with at least 30 years of paid contributions and registered as 
unemployed for at least 6 months, but with a high penalty, from 6% to 8% per year (8% for those with only 30 
years of contribution, 6% for those with at least 40 years of contribution). Pensions became compatible with 
part-time work (but the pension benefit was reduced according to the length of the working day).  
A new law on Social Security measures was enacted in 2007. This package of reforms contains as main 
measures: increase in the effective contribution period to be eligible for a retirement pension; partial retirement 
from age 61 instead of 60 for people entering the system after 1967 (and a minimum of 30 years of contribution 
instead of 15); incentives for people working after age 65; more restrictive rules to get an invalidity pension. 
France 
The standard retirement age remains 60. Since 2004, gradual alignment of public sector with private sector by 
increasing the number of contribution years for entitlement to a full pension (from 37.5 to 40 years between 2004 
and 2008). Since 2009, the numbers of contribution years will increase following the increase in life expectancy 
through a rule keeping constant the ratio of the number of contribution years and the number of years in pension 
to the level of 1.79 as in 2003. The number of contribution years will be increased to 41 in 2012 and 41.50 in 
2020 due to the expected gains in life expectancy (by 1.5 years each 10 years). Introduction of a bonus (3% per 
year) in case of postponement of retirement. The penalty for early-retirement (before 40 years of contributions) 
will be changed. Since 2006, the amount of the penalty (la décote) will decrease gradually from 10% to 5% of 
pension per year of anticipation in 2015 for the private sector and will increase from 0.5% to 5% for civil 
servants).  
Italy 
Since 2006, the major changes to pension legislation concern the implementation of the 23rd July Agreement on 
welfare state between government and social partners (Law 127/2007 and Law 247/2007) and Law 133/2008) 
improving the possibility of accumulating pension and labour income. 
A. Law 127/2007: increase of lower amount pensions through an additional lump sum of 420 euro per year from 
2008 (327 euro in 2007) acknowledged to pensioners of 64 and over with an income lower than 1.5 times the 
minimum pension (8.504,73 euro per year in 2007). Such an increase is reduced or augmented by 20% for 
contribution careers inferior to 15 years or superior to 25, respectively (18 and 28, for the self-employed). 
Additional increases are also foreseen for social assistance pensions, starting from 2008, by way of the so-called 
‘social assistance additional lump sums’ (‘maggiorazioni sociali’).  
B. Law 247/2007 foresees the following: 
• a slowdown of the process of elevating the minimum requirements for early retirement, keeping unchanged 
the phased-in values foreseen by Law 243/2004. In particular, in 2008 the age requirement, with 35 years of 
contribution, is 58 for the employees and 59 for the self-employed instead of 60 and 61. Starting from 2013 
(it was 2014, according to Law 243/2004) the age requirement, with 35 years of contribution, is 62 for the 
employees and 63 for the self-employed. In addition, starting from July 2009, workers may access early 
retirement at an age lower by 1 year, provided that they possess at least 36 years of contributions. The age 
requirement may be reduced by at most 3 years (but never below the age of 57) for specific categories of 
workers involved in hard and stressful jobs (‘lavori usuranti’), within a given amount of resources assigned 
to a specific fund; 
• the application in 2010 of the transformation coefficients, revised on the basis of the procedure foreseen by 
Law 335/95. The subsequent revisions will be made every three years, instead of every ten years, through a 
simplified procedure falling entirely under the administrative sphere of competence; 
• an increase of the contribution rate of the atypical workers by 3 percentage points (up to 26% in 2010) in 
order to improve pension adequacy for this category of workers.  
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C. Law 133/2008 states that old age and seniority pensions may be fully cumulated with labour income. The new 
legislation improves upon the previous one which foresaw some restrictions in the possibility of cumulating, 
especially in the case of employees. 
Latvia 
Under the new three-pillar system with a defined contribution PAYG based on notional accounts, set up in 1996, 
the standard age requirement for women will increase by 6 months each year to reach 62 by 2008. Those for men 
reached 62 in 2003. 
Lithuania 
The standard minimum retirement age for women (55 years and 4 months in 1995, 58.5 years in 2003) will 
increase by 6 months each year to reach 60 years in 2006. The retirement age for men was gradually increased (2 
months per year) from 60 years and 2 months (in 1995) up to 62.5 in 2003. 
Hungary 
The 1997 pension reform: 
(1) aimed to raise gradually (by one year in every two years) the statutory pension age for men from 60 to 62 and 
for women from 55 to 62 by 2009;  
(2) started to build up a new framework of mandatory pension system by splitting on two part, dominantly 
PAYG pension pillar and partly the funded pension pillar;  
(3) the new mixed system (appr. 3/4 payg-1/4 funded pillar) is obliged to step in for the new entrants, for the 
others the choice was optional.  
In 2006-2007, the Hungarian Parliament adopted (by two regulations) a package of reforms which specifies that 
the early retirement is allowed only 2 years before normal retirement instead of 3 before. Thus from 2013 the 
early retirement is possible from age 60 both for women and men. From 2013 all early pensions will be subject 
to a reduction. The rate of reduction, depending on the time remaining until retirement age, would be 0.3% per 
month for the 61-62 age-group and 0.4% per month below the age of 61.  It introduces also changes in the 
calculation of the benefits, a minimum contribution from 40-41 for early retirement and some favourable 
retirement conditions for those working in potentially health-damaging occupations.  
Malta 
In December 2006, the Maltese Government completed the legislative process associated with the enactment of 
the pensions reform bill. Among the most important elements of the reform there is a staggered rise in pension 
age from 60 years for females and 61 years for males to 65 years for both by 2026 and the gradual lengthening of 
the contribution period for full entitlement to the two-thirds pension from 30 years to 40 years. Meanwhile, the 
calculation of pensionable income will reflect the yearly average income during the best 10 calendar years within 
the last forty years, as opposed to the previous regime which consisted of the best 3 years of the last ten years for 
employed persons and the average of the best ten years for self-employed persons. In addition, prior to the 
reform, the maximum pensionable income was fixed by the law though in recent years it was revised in line with 
the cost of living adjustment. Following the reform, maximum pensionable income will evolve in a more 
dynamic fashion and will be increased annually by 70 per cent of the national average wage and 30 per cent of 
the inflation rate as from 1 January 2014 for persons born after 1 January 1962. 
Austria 
The minimum retirement age for men will increase from 61.5 years to 65 years; for women the age will rise from 
56.5 to 60 years. The increase will be phased in gradually beginning in July 2004 and by 2017 early retirement 
will be eliminated. Meanwhile, larger penalties are imposed on early retirement (4.2% of reduction per year 
instead of the former 3.75%, up to a maximum of 15%), within the age of 62-65. The statutory retirement age for 
women will be increased gradually between 2019 and 2034 to reach the retirement age for men at 65. A bonus 
for later retirement up to the age of 68 years (4.2% per year, up to a maximum of 10 %) is introduced. From 
January 2005, harmonised guaranteed pension accounts is established (Act on the harmonisation of pension 
system, approved in November 2004). In the new system of individual, transparent pension accounts (with a 
clear reporting of benefits accrued from contributions paid in and other credits acquired, such as from active 
child and elderly care) the key rule will be : 45-65-80 (45 contribution years, retirement age of 65 and a gross 
replacement rate of 80% of average life earnings). Pension benefits will be adjusted to consumer price index, 
starting in 2006. 
Poland 
The general system: All insured persons born after 1948 are covered by the new defined contribution PAYG 
with notional accounts and three-pillar pension system. The standard retirement age remains 65 for male and 60 
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for female. There will be no early pension for those born after 1948 and retiring after 2008, with the exception of 
miners. Since 2007, disability pension insurance contributions were reduced. 
Portugal 
Portugal introduced in 2007 a "Sustainability factor" linking initial benefits to average life expectancy when the 
worker retires (at 65, which is the legal retirement age). Individuals have the option of postponing retirement 
beyond legal retirement age to compensate (at least partially) the financial penalty given by the sustainability 
factor. They introduced also a "national strategy for the promotion of active ageing" which is a package of 
measures that encourages older workers to remain in the labour force (trainings, improvement of older workers 
employment, higher penalty in case of early retirement and benefits granted in case of long contributive careers). 
Slovenia  
Under the new Pension and Disability Insurance Act entered into force on 1 January 2000 (a three-pillar 
modernised defined benefit  PAYG system plus compulsory and voluntary supplementary funded schemes), the 
standard retirement age has been increased. It is now possible to retire between 58 and 63 for men and 61 for 
women (the minimum retirement age was 53 for women and 58 for men before the reform). Women that worked 
before the age of 18 can retire earlier (but not before the age of 55). Special regulations reduce the age of 
retirement to 55 in certain cases (before the reform it was possible even below 50). The minimum retirement age 
is raised from 53 to 58 for women (the same level for men). The accrual rate was reduced by 2% to 1.5% since 
2000. Later retirement has been encouraged: a person who fulfils the requirement for pension but continues to 
work beyond the age 63/61 will receive an additional pension increase (3.6% the first additional year, 2.4% the 
second year and 1.2% in the third, plus the normal rate of accrual, 1.5% per year). 
Slovakia 
Under the reformed (from 2004) three–pillar pension system, the standard retirement age has increased from 60 
to 62 for men (9 month per year) by 2006 and from the former 57 (gradually reduced down to age of 53 for 
women who brought 5 children or more) to 62 for women by 2014. A worker can still retire earlier if the 
combined benefit from the first and the newly introduced second pillar equal at least 60% of the minimum living 
standard determined by the government. In this case, the pension is reduced by 6% per year, while a bonus of 6% 
is introduced for those postponing their retirement. It is also possible to get pension benefit while working. 
Finland 
Since 2005, flexible old-age retirement (63 to 68 years) with an increase of the accrual rate to 4.5% for those 
continuing to work beyond the age of 63. The ceiling on the maximum pension is abolished. A new early 
retirement scheme is introduced with a minimum age of 62 and an actuarial reduction of 0.6% per month prior to 
63. Those borne after 1949 are not eligible for the unemployment pension scheme, which is replaced by an 
extended period of unemployment benefit (the so-called “unemployment pipeline to retirement (currently 57-65).
Sweden 
The pension reform was approved by Parliament in 1999. Under the new notional defined contribution system is 
possible to retire from age 61 onwards, with an actuarially fair compensation for those who stay on in the labour 
force. Every year of contributions is important for the pension benefit. A person with an average wage will 
increase his yearly pension benefit by nearly 60 per cent if he postpones his retirement decision till age 67 
compared to leaving at age 61. Yearly “statement of account” informs the individual of costs and benefits of 
retirement. The new system is phased in gradually for generations born between 1938 and 1953, and will affect 
generations born after 1953 fully.  
The United Kingdom  
Between 2010 and 2020, women’s pensionable age will gradually rise from 60 to 65, as for men. The Pension 
Act 2007 adds also several measures in which we have the gradual increase of the state pension age between 
2024 and 2046 to 68 for men and women (instead of 65 before). 
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Reforms enacted after July 2008 
 
The projections in the 2009 Ageing Report were carried out on the basis of legislation and policies in place by 
July 2008. In some countries, reforms have been implemented after that date and are thus not incorporated in the 
projections. A brief description of recent reforms in some Member States is provided here. 
 
Bulgaria* 
Since October 1, 2008 all old-age pensions, assigned before December 31, 2007, were recalculated, using a 
different base which is now the 2007 average insurance income (EUR 203.6). The recalculation was made to 
unify pension-determining parameters (individual coefficient and length of service), and to overcome their 
different size.  
As of 1 January 2009 the insurance contribution rate to the State Social Insurance Pensions Fund was 
reduced from 22% to 18%. The contribution rate of the employers was set at 10% and that of the employees 
- at 8%. In addition to the employers and employees, the state entered as a third party providing 12% of the 
overall amount of the annual contributions to the State Social Insurance Pensions Fund.  
Following the change in the insurance contribution rate the total social security burden was reduced by 
2.4pps for employers, while for employees it remained at the same level. Not taking into account the health 
insurance contribution, the social security burden dropped by 3.6pps for employers and by 0.8pps for 
employees.  
As of January 1, 2009 the minimum pensions were increased by 10.0%. 
The old-age pensions were raised as of April 1, 2009 by increasing the weight of each insurance year in the 
pension formula from 1 to 1.1. In addition starting from 1 April, the maximum pension amount (excluding 
bonuses thereto) was increased to EUR 357.9, from EUR 250.5.  
As of July 1, 2009 pensions were updated by 9.0% following the so called Swiss rule. 
* Changes have been incorporated in the Law on the Budget of the State Social Security for 2009 (SG N 109/23.12.2008) and the 
amendments in the Code of social insurance (SG.N 42/05.06.2009). 
Italy 
According to the Law no. 102/2009 (conversion in law, with amendments and integrations, of the Decree 
Law no. 78/2009) the statutory retirement age of women in the public sector (currently 60) is foreseen to 
increase by one year every two, starting from 2010, in order to equalise the statutory retirement age of men 
(currently 65) by 2018. Such intervention has been adopted to implement the sentence of the European Court 
of Justice imposing the elimination of any gender difference in the retirement age in the public sector. 
Besides, law no. 102/2009 lays down a five-year indexation mechanism linking the age retirement 
prerequisites to changes in life expectancy ascertained over the preceding five-year period. Such a 
mechanism is foreseen to be applied starting from 2015, once the increasing process of contribution and age 
requirements to retire, already stated by the current legislation, is fully phased in. As regards the first 
application of the mechanism, the increase of the statutory retirement age, related to changes in life 
expectancy over the preceding five-year period, cannot exceed three months. The normative dispositions 
concerning the technical definition and the enforcement of such an indexation mechanism will have to be 
enacted by 31st December, 2014. 
Cyprus 
Within the context of combating the effects of demographic ageing on the Social Insurance Scheme, the 
Government has adopted measures to safeguard the long-term financial sustainability of the Social Security 
Scheme at least until 2048. Social Insurance legislation has been amended as of 1 April, 2009 (Amendment 
Law 22(I)/09), with measures aiming at increase in the revenue and containment of the expenditure of the 
Social Insurance Fund. 
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1. Revenue side 
− Gradual increase in contribution rate – 1.3p.p. every 5 years: from 1.4.2009 (1st increase) until 
1.1.2039 (final increase) 
2. Expenditure side 
− Increase in the number of years of contribution required for eligibility to old-age pension – 10 years 
paid contributions, instead of 3 
− Increase in the number of years of contribution required for eligibility to the old-age lump sum – 6 
years paid contributions, instead of 3 
− Maximum limit on the number of education/ training credits granted - 6 years, instead of unlimited 
number of years 
− Abolition of the right, as of January 2010, to receive unemployment benefit for all those insured 
persons who take early or normal retirement, and are eligible for pension benefits from a non-
contributory occupational pension plan. 
The amending legislation also provides for on-going monitoring of the long-term financial position of the 
Social Insurance Fund. Every three years the Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance should present to the 
Parliament an actuarial valuation of the system. Based on the actuarial valuation additional measures to 
secure long-term viability of SIF may be submitted if needed. 
In addition to the measures above the Government aims at improving the investment returns of the reserve of 
the Social Insurance Fund by introducing a new investment framework and policy which will be based on 
internationally accepted governance and investment process standards and best practices.  
Latvia 
Since July 2008, the Latvian authorities have introduced the following policy changes:  
The amount of early retirement pension is 50% from calculated pension (till 30 June, 2009 it was 
80%). 
From 2011 - CPI based indexation (before: indexation was depending on individual pension amount 
– low-amount pensions were indexed on April 1, considering an actual consumer price index and on 
October 1, considering an actual consumer price index and 50 per cent of real growth of 
contribution wage sum; medium-amount pensions were indexed annually on October 1, considering 
an actual consumer price index; high-amount pensions were not indexed) and indexation is frozen 
in 2009 and 2010. 
Reduction of contribution rates to 2nd tier: 2009- from 8% to 2%; 2010 -2%; 2011 -4%; 2012 and 
for all next years -6% (before: 2009 -8%; 2010 -9%; 2011 and for all next years -10%). 
Poland 
Bridging pensions have been implemented from 2009, which replaces early retirement provision for some 
categories of workers. This is temporary solution for workers, whose started work in special conditions 
before 1999. 
Portugal 
Within the scope of the 2006 Agreement on the Social Security Reform, the new legislation on the financing 
(contributive) system of the Social Security General Regime was published in September 2009 (Law no. 
110/2009 of 16 September) and discussed in National Parliament but postponed in implementation to 2011 
due to the current economic crisis. The main elements of the new contributive code, impacting on the 
financial sustainability of the social security system, through the expected increase in revenue, are the 
following. 
i) In relation to wage earners: 
Enlargement of the contributive base to fringe benefits previously not considered (travel expenses, 
participation in enterprise profits,…) in a progressive way (33% in 2011, 66% in 2012 and 100% 
from 2013 on); 
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Differentiation of the employers’ contribution rate (23.75%) according to the labour contract type 
by decreasing 1 percentage points (p.p.) in the case of permanent contracts and increasing it 3 p.p. 
for temporary contracts; 
Incentives to postpone retirement by reducing further the contributory rate for those who are 
eligible to a full pension (the reduction applies to employer and employee). 
ii) Concerning self-employees: 
Entities that contract self-employees’ services have to contribute to Social Security, with the 
contribution base being 70% of the service paid. The contribution rate is 2.5% in 2011 and 5% from 
2012 on; 
Employees contributive base is now determined by the Social Security services taken into account 
tax declared earnings and it is foreseen a progressive (yearly) adjustment of the contributive base; 
Employees contributive rate is now harmonised (29.6% over 20% of the sales amount or 24.6% 
over 70% of the value of services provided).  
iii) For all workers: 
Harmonization of the contribution rates according to the risks covered, reducing the number of 
special regimes. 
Slovakia 
• Opening of the second pillar in 2009: 
For the second time, from 15 November 2008 to 30 June 2009, all pension savers were again (as in 
the year 2008) given the chance to leave the 2nd pillar while, at the same time, those individuals 
who have not entered yet were allowed to join in. During this period 66 thousand people left the 
2nd pillar and 14,6 thousand people joined the 2nd pillar. Because of this measure, the number of 
savers in the 2nd pillar declined by 3,5%. 
Hungary 
The 2009 reform had three strands: 
1) Increase in the statutory retirement age from 62 to 65 between 2014 and 2022 (increase by 6 months for 
every cohort, those born in 1952 should retire at the age 62.5, born in 1953 at 63 etc.). The advanced 
retirement age also increases gradually form 60 to 63. 
2) Less generous indexation of pensions dependent on real GDP growth, as of 2010 
 share of component in index 
real GDP growth  consumer prices nominal wages 
<3.0 100 0 
3.0-3.9 80 20 
4.0-4.9 60 40 
5.0< 50 50 
The earlier used Swiss indexation formula will be applied only if the real GDP growth exceeds 5.0%. 
3) Abolition of 13th month pension from second half of 2009 and introduction of pension premium. 
13th pension has been phased in between 2004 and 2006, then capped at HUF 80,000 (average pension 
benefit) in 2008, and cancelled from second half of 2009 (so first of two instalments has been paid) 
Pension premium will be provided if the real GDP growth is higher than 3.5%. The amount of pension 
premium gradually increases according to the size of GDP growth. If the GDP growth is 7.5% or more, this 
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amount is equal to the earlier 13th month pension, but the premium is also capped at HUF 80,000. 
In consequence of these reforms future sustainability will be improved and gross social security pension 
expenditure will reach 10.5% of GDP in 2060 instead of 13.8% projected in the Ageing Report 2009. 
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Annex 7: Current pension expenditure  
 
In 2007, there was a wide difference in the average public pension benefit ranging from less 
than 3000 euro or less per year (Bulgaria, Romania, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) to 14000 
euro or more per year (Austria, Sweden, Denmark, France, Norway and Luxembourg). These 
wide differences reflect that average wage income levels are very different (ranging from less 
than 5000 euro per year to more than 25000 euro per year)12 and the diversity of pension 
systems and arrangements (see Figure 16).13  
Figure 17 shows the public pension expenditure in 2000 and 2007. In the EU27, public 
pension expenditure was about 10.1% of GDP in 2007. Compared with 2000, the 
pension/GDP ratio has increased in eight countries (Romania, Norway, Malta, Portugal, 
Denmark, Sweden, France and Italy) over this period.  
Figure 16 - Average gross wage and average gross public pension benefit in 2007 (1000s euro) 
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Source: Commission services, EPC 
A very large difference in the level of public pension spending can be observed in 2007 
among Member States. It ranges from 6% of GDP or below in Latvia, Lithuania and Ireland 
to 14% in Italy. In many Member States (Denmark, France, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Norway, 
Portugal, Romania and Sweden), pension expenditure has increased faster than GDP, but in 
some others (Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Latvia, the Netherlands, Poland, Slovenia) it has increased at a slower pace. 
Half of Member States (the Netherlands, Spain, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Sweden, 
Finland, Germany, Portugal, Poland, Austria, France and Italy), has also provided information 
on government tax revenues from public and private pensions. However, the incomplete 
coverage hampers a comparable examination across the EU. The presence of tax revenues 
from public pensions means that the net public pension expenditure is lower. However, in 
most countries the size of these taxes is rather small, on average of the order of 1 ½ p.p. of 
GDP in 2000 and 2007 (see Figure 18). 
                                                 
12 It is important to note that calculations of average wages are different in OECD and ISG projections. 
13 In some countries (e.g. Slovenia, Hungary) pension benefits are not subject to taxation so gross pensions equal 
net pensions. 
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In some countries, tax revenues from private pensions are large (e.g. in the Netherlands, 
Denmark). This is mainly due to the maturity of occupational pensions.  
Figure 17 - Average Gross public pension expenditure in 2000 and 2007 (% of GDP) 
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Source: Commission services, EPC 
Note: The graph presents only the countries which provided information in both years.  
 
Figure 18 - Gross and net public pension expenditure in 2000 and 2007 (% of GDP) 
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Note: The graph presents only the countries which provided data for both years and a tax on pension is non zero. 
France and Italy did not provide data for 2000. 
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Annex 8: Decomposition of pension expenditure 
 
In order to analyse the dynamics and the factors of the pension spending to GDP ratio, the following 
decomposition is used:  
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In particular, we analyse the percentage change in the public pension expenditure to GDP ratio. The overall 
percentage change can be expressed as a sum of the contribution of the four main factors, i.e. the dependency 
ratio contribution, the coverage ratio contribution, the employment rate contribution and the benefit ratio 
contribution. 
 
The dependency ratio effect/contribution quantifies the impact of the change in the old age dependency ratio on 
the pension to GDP ratio. The dependency ratio is defined as a ratio of the population aged over 65 to the 
population aged from 15 to 64. An increase in this ratio indicates a higher proportion of older individuals with 
respect to working age population, i.e. an ageing population. As the dependency ratio increases, the pension to 
GDP ratio moves in the same direction. 
 
The coverage ratio effect is defined as the number of pensioners of all ages to population over 65 years. 
Development in the coverage ratio provides information about developments of the effective exit age and the 
percentage of population covered. As the coverage ratio increases, the pension expenditure to GDP ratio 
increases as well. 
 
The employment rate effect is defined as a ratio of population aged 15-64 to the number of working people aged 
15-64 (i.e. 1/employment rate). As the employment rate increases, the ratio of pension expenditure to GDP falls 
down. 
 
The benefit ratio effect indicates the development of the relative value of the average pension (public pension 
spending / number of pensioners) with respect to the average wage (proxied by the change in the GDP per hours 
worked). 
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Table 4 - Decomposition of the public pension spending to GDP ratio over 2007 – 2060 (% of GDP) 
2007 level Dependency ratio contribution
Coverage ratio 
contribution
Employment 
effect 
contribution
Benefit ratio 
contribution Interaction effect 2060 level
BE 10.0 7.4 -0.9 -0.5 -1.0 -0.3 14.7
BG 8.3 9.1 -3.0 -0.5 -1.8 -0.8 11.3
CZ 7.8 9.5 -3.5 -0.5 -1.2 -1.1 11.0
DK 9.1 6.5 -4.9 -0.1 -0.5 -0.7 9.2
DE 10.4 7.9 -1.9 -0.8 -2.2 -0.8 12.8
EE 5.6 4.6 -1.6 -0.2 -3.1 -0.4 4.9
IE 4.0 5.9 -1.5 -0.2 0.7 -0.3 8.6
EL 11.7 12.7 -0.4 -0.6 0.8 -0.1 24.1
ES 8.4 10.7 -0.9 -0.9 -1.7 -0.5 15.1
FR 13.0 8.4 -2.2 -0.5 -4.0 -0.7 14.0
IT 14.0 10.4 -3.2 -1.1 -5.5 -1.0 13.6
CY 6.3 10.8 1.6 -0.5 -0.3 -0.2 17.7
LV 5.4 5.7 -1.6 -0.2 -3.9 -0.4 5.1
LT 6.8 9.6 -2.4 0.0 -1.8 -0.8 11.4
LU 8.7 8.4 5.2 0.0 1.2 0.3 23.9
HU 10.9 11.3 -5.4 -0.7 -1.1 -1.0 13.8
MT 7.2 11.3 -3.1 -0.7 -0.5 -0.8 13.4
NL 6.6 6.6 -1.5 -0.2 -0.6 -0.4 10.5
AT 12.8 9.9 -2.6 -0.5 -5.0 -1.0 13.6
PL 11.6 13.4 -6.3 -1.0 -7.1 -1.8 8.8
PT 11.4 9.8 -1.7 -0.6 -4.5 -0.9 13.4
RO 6.6 13.6 -4.9 0.3 1.7 -1.5 15.8
SI 9.9 13.7 -3.5 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7 18.6
SK 6.8 11.7 -3.9 -0.6 -2.4 -1.4 10.2
FI 10.0 8.7 -3.1 -0.6 -0.9 -0.7 13.4
SE 9.5 5.6 -0.4 -0.4 -4.3 -0.6 9.4
UK 6.6 4.2 -1.4 -0.3 0.5 -0.3 9.3
NO 8.9 8.2 -1.2 0.3 -2.4 -0.2 13.6
EU27 10.1 8.7 -2.6 -0.7 -2.5 -0.6 12.5
EA 11.0 9.0 -2.0 -0.7 -2.9 -0.7 13.8
EA12 11.1 8.8 -1.9 -0.7 -2.9 -0.7 13.8
EU15 10.2 7.7 -1.8 -0.6 -2.3 -0.6 12.6
EU10 9.7 11.8 -4.9 -0.7 -3.9 -1.3 10.7
EU25 10.2 8.5 -2.4 -0.7 -2.5 -0.6 12.5  
Source: 2009 Ageing Report. 
Note: Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. According to the revised pension projections, public 
pension expenditure is projected to decrease from 10.9% of GDP in 2007 to 10.5% of GDP in 2060, i.e. by 0.4 
p.p. of GDP, compared with the projection in the 2009 Ageing Report, where an increase of 3 p.p. of GDP 
between 2007 and 2060 was projected. The revised projection is not included in this table. 
Table 5 - Decomposition of the sum of public spending and occupational and private pensions to GDP 
ratio over 2007–60, (in percentage points)  
2007 level
Dependency 
ratio 
contribution
Coverage 
ratio 
contribution
Employment 
effect 
contribution
Benefit ratio 
contribution
Interaction 
effect 2060 level
BG 8.3 9.1 -3.2 -0.5 -1.8 1.2 13.0
DK 14.7 6.5 -8.0 -0.2 -0.8 6.0 18.1
EE 5.6 4.6 -1.8 -0.2 -3.6 2.1 6.7
IE 5.2 5.9 -2.1 -0.3 0.9 1.6 11.3
ES 9.0 10.7 -0.9 -1.0 -1.9 0.5 16.4
LV 5.4 5.7 -2.0 -0.2 -5.2 6.3 10.0
LT 6.8 9.6 -2.7 0.0 -2.0 1.7 13.3
HU 10.9 11.3 -4.5 -0.7 -2.4 1.5 16.0
NL 11.7 6.6 -2.7 -0.3 -1.2 8.4 22.6
PL 11.6 13.4 -6.5 -1.0 -7.6 0.7 10.6
PT 12.0 9.8 -1.6 -0.6 -4.9 -0.7 14.0
RO 6.6 13.6 -5.1 0.3 1.7 0.7 17.7
SI 9.9 13.7 -3.5 -0.1 -0.7 0.0 19.3
SK 6.8 11.7 -4.2 -0.6 -2.7 1.4 12.4
SE 12.2 5.6 -0.5 -0.5 -6.2 3.7 14.4  
Source: 2009 Ageing Report. 
 37
Note: Other pensions cover occupational and private pensions. This table only includes Member States that have 
provided private pillar pension expenditure projections in addition to public pension projections, and does 
consequently not include all Member States. Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. The revised 
projection is not included in this table. See note to Table 4. 
Annex 9: Detailed comparison with the 2001 and 2006 
rounds of projections 
 
Table 6 presents the change in pension expenditure as a share of GDP between 2005 and 2050 
in consecutive projections: the common projection exercises in 2001, 2006 and 2009. It 
reveals that, for most countries, the change in pension expenditure as a share of GDP has been 
revised over time, sometimes significantly. On average in the EU-15, the reduction in the 
projection increase in the pension ratio has been reduced by almost ¾ p.p. of GDP. Looking at 
the EA12, the projected reduction in the projected increase is larger, about 1 ½ p.p. of GDP.  
Table 6 – Long-term pension projections compared (in percentage points) 
Pension expenditure, change in p.p. of GDP, 2005-2050
projection carried out:
2001 2006 2009
BE 3.8 5.1 4.8
BG : : 2.5
CZ : 5.6 2.4
DK 2.0 3.2 0.5
DE 5.5 1.9 1.9
EE : -3.0 -0.3
IE 4.5 6.5 4.0
EL 12.4 : 12.3
ES 8.5 7.0 7.0
FR 3.6 2.0 1.2
IT 0.3 0.4 0.7
CY : 12.8 9.2
LV : -0.9 0.4
LT : 1.9 3.6
LU 1.9 7.4 13.4
HU : 6.4 2.4
MT : -0.5 4.8
NL 5.3 3.8 3.7
AT 2.5 -1.0 1.2
PL : -5.7 -3.1
PT 2.3 9.3 2.0
RO : : 7.1
SI : 7.3 8.3
SK : 1.5 2.6
FI 5.0 3.3 3.2
SE 1.5 0.9 -0.5
UK -0.9 1.9 1.5
EU27 : : 2.2
EA : : 2.8
EU15 2.9 2.3 2.2
EU12 : : 1.5
EU25 : 2.1
EA12 4.2 2.6 2.8
EU10 : 0.4  
Source: 2009 Ageing Report, Commission services, EPC 
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Note: 2001 projection: FR: change between 2005 and 2040, IE: % of GNP. 2009 projection: change between 
2007 and 2050, IE: 2009 projection: only social security pensions. Note: Hungary reformed its pension system in 
2009. According to the revised pension projections, public pension expenditure is projected to decrease by 1 p.p. 
of GDP between 2007 and 2050. This revised projection is not included in this table. 
Figure 19 presents the change in public pension expenditure as a share of GDP between 2007 
and 2050 in the current projection exercises and as projected in 2006. It reveals that, for most 
countries, the change in pension expenditure as a share of GDP has been revised over time, 
sometimes significantly (as reflected by the distance from the 45 degree line in Figure 22).14 
Compared with the 2006 pension projection exercise, pension expenditure is now projected to 
be fairly similar for the EU25 (rising by 2.1% of GDP, compared with 2.2% of GDP in the 
2006 Ageing Report).15  
Pension expenditure is now projected to increase more (or decrease less) in Estonia, Italy, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Austria, Poland, Slovenia, Slovakia, with large 
upward revisions of 1.5 p.p. of GDP or more in Estonia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, 
Austria, Poland.16 By contrast, a lower increase (or higher decrease) is now projected in 
Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, France, Cyprus, Hungary, Latvia, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, the UK, with significant downward revisions of 1.5 
p.p. of GDP or more in the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Cyprus, Hungary and 
Portugal.  
Figure 19 - Change in the public pension to GDP (2007-50) compared: 2006 Ageing Report and current 
projection (in percentage points) 
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14 A small discrepancy between the changes in the consecutive projection exercises may be due to different 
starting year used; for the 2006 projection, the change is calculated over the period 2004-2050 and in the current 
projection it is calculated over the period 2007-2050. 
15 It should be noted that the projection for Greece is included in the current projection exercise, which was not 
the case in the 2006 Ageing Report. Excluding Greece from the EU25 aggregate would lead to a lower increase 
in the current projection, of 1.9 p.p. of GDP. 
16 For Luxembourg, substantial differences between 2006 and 2009 projections results are due to the fact that a 
new projection methodology for cross border workers is introduced in the 2009 exercise, leading to a sensible 
reduction in labour input and potential growth. 
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Source: 2009 Ageing Report. 
Note: Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. According to the revised pension projections, public 
pension expenditure is projected to decrease by 1p.p. of GDP between 2007 and 2050. The revised projection is 
not included in this table. 
The revisions of projected changes in pension expenditure over the long-term are due to 
several factors, notably but not exclusively due to reforms of pension systems. Also other 
factors can have an effect, such as changes in the demographic and macro-economic 
assumptions, changes in modelling pension expenditure over the long-term and changes in the 
coverage of the projection (data on pension schemes covered in the projection).  
In order to shed light on the reasons behind these revisions, a comparison of a decomposition 
of the change in public pension expenditure between the 2006 Ageing Report and the current 
projection exercise into four factors is conducted, like in section 3 above. 
The overview Table 7 presents a decomposition of the public pension to GDP ratio in 2006 
and 2009 projections. An analysis of the reasons behind the revisions for each country is 
provided in the country fiches on the pension projection and results envisaged for release in 
the latter half of 2009. The main points may be summarized as follows:  
• As shown in section 3 above, the main factor behind the projected increase in pension 
expenditure is the demographic transition to an older population. The dependency effect 
has decreased in a majority of countries Portugal, Ireland, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, 
Austria, Spain, the UK, Italy, Hungary, Denmark, Belgium, Finland, France, Slovenia, 
Germany and Sweden, and it has increased only in few the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Slovakia, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania and Malta. 
• The other factors are in general offsetting the increase that follows from the larger number 
and share of older people. In the 2009 projection exercise, the fall in coverage is more 
accentuated, thus offsetting the dependency effect to a greater extent in a majority of 
countries. These reflect changes in pension policies that have aimed at increasing the 
effective retirement age either through increases in the statutory retirement age and/or 
through tightening access to early and disability pension schemes. Compared with the 
2006 projection exercise, the largest reductions in the coverage ratio are projected in 
Malta, Denmark and the UK. By contrast, it increases in Austria, Spain and Luxembourg. 
An increase in the coverage effect may be due to a higher take-up of pensions by women 
thanks to their increasing participation in the labour market even if there is a lower take-
up of pensions by men due to reforms undertaken. 
• The employment effect contributes to offset the dependency effect too. As already seen 
before, the effect is rather small in most countries and it generally offsets less in the 
current exercise compared with the 2006 projection. This partly follows from the fact that 
employment rates have generally risen in the period since the previous projection was 
carried out and that the structural unemployment rates have not been reduced to the same 
extent. This leads to lower gains in employment rates over the projection period compared 
with the situation at the time of the previous projection. 
• The benefit effect shows the extent to which average pensions increase at a different pace 
than average income (proxied by output per worker). The benefit effect can offset the 
dependency effect if: (i) the determination of the value of  (future) accrued pension rights 
– eventually becoming pension benefits - is changed; (ii) the evolution of the pension after 
retirement is slower than average income (pension indexation below wage growth). It 
helps to offset the dependency effect in almost all countries, reflecting in many cases 
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reforms that have been introduced so as to make the public pension systems more robust 
to demographic changes. In the Czech Republic, Denmark, Ireland, Spain, France, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, the 
offsetting impact of the relative benefit reduction has increased compared with the 
previous 2006 projection and in particular for Hungary, Cyprus, Luxembourg, Sweden, 
Lithuania, Portugal and the Czech Republic. A common feature for some of these latter 
set of countries (Hungary, Portugal, the Czech Republic) is that they have introduced 
strong pension reforms since the completion of the 2006 Ageing Report. As a result, the 
overall increase in the public pension ratio is now projected to be considerably smaller. 
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Table 7 - Decomposition of the public pension/GDP ratio over 2007–50 in the 2006 and 2009 projections 
(in percentage points) 
Projection 
year
Dependen
cy ratio
Coverage 
ratio
Employme
nt rate
Benefit 
Ratio
Change 
2007 - 
2050 in %
BE 2006 7.7 -0.4 -0.9 -1.2 5.1
2009 6.7 -0.7 -0.5 -0.6 4.8
BG 2006
2009 7.5 -2.2 -0.3 -1.8 2.5
CZ 2006 10.5 -3.5 -0.3 -0.6 5.6
2009 8.3 -3.2 -0.5 -1.2 2.4
DK 2006 7.2 -2.8 -0.4 -0.5 3.2
2009 6.2 -4.2 -0.2 -0.6 0.5
DE 2006 7.5 -0.6 -1.1 -3.5 1.9
2009 7.3 -1.8 -0.7 -2.2 1.9
EE 2006 3.1 -1.5 -0.6 -3.8 -3.0
2009 3.7 -1.3 -0.1 -2.3 -0.3
IE 2006 7.9 -1.4 -0.5 0.8 6.5
2009 5.3 -1.4 -0.2 0.6 4.0
EL 2006
2009 12.7 -1.2 -0.7 1.8 12.3
ES 2006 12.4 -2.3 -1.8 -0.8 7.0
2009 10.6 -1.0 -0.9 -1.1 7.0
FR 2006 8.7 -1.8 -0.9 -3.5 2.0
2009 8.2 -2.1 -0.5 -3.8 1.2
IT 2006 11.5 -3.2 -2.0 -5.3 0.4
2009 10.4 -3.3 -1.2 -4.2 0.7
CY 2006 10.2 1.2 -1.2 2.5 12.8
2009 8.0 1.6 -0.5 0.2 9.2
LV 2006 3.4 -1.3 -0.7 -2.3 -0.9
2009 4.3 -1.1 0.0 -2.6 0.4
LT 2006 5.4 -2.1 -1.0 -0.2 1.9
2009 6.8 -1.4 0.1 -1.3 3.6
LU 2006 7.2 2.5 -4.4 2.1 7.4
2009 7.6 4.9 0.0 0.6 13.4
HU 2006 10.5 -4.5 -1.1 2.0 6.4
2009 9.5 -4.7 -0.7 -0.8 2.4
MT 2006 7.3 -1.0 -1.2 -5.0 -0.5
2009 9.1 -2.8 -0.7 -0.2 4.8
NL 2006 6.3 -1.6 -0.2 -0.4 3.8
2009 6.3 -1.5 -0.2 -0.5 3.7
AT 2006 11.3 -5.8 -1.3 -4.3 -1.0
2009 9.3 -3.1 -0.5 -3.6 1.2
PL 2006 10.4 -5.7 -3.2 -6.3 -5.7
2009 11.3 -5.7 -0.9 -5.6 -2.5
PT 2006 13.7 -0.9 -0.2 -3.0 9.3
2009 9.4 -1.9 -0.7 -3.8 2.0
RO 2006
2009 10.6 -3.5 0.5 2.0 8.3
SI 2006 13.3 -3.6 -1.0 -0.9 7.3
2009 12.9 -3.0 -0.1 -0.7 8.3
SK 2006 9.0 -2.5 -1.3 -3.1 1.5
2009 9.6 -3.3 -0.4 -1.9 2.6
FI 2006 8.8 -3.1 -0.9 -0.8 3.3
2009 7.9 -2.9 -0.6 -0.5 3.2
SE 2006 4.8 -0.2 -0.6 -2.8 0.9
2009 4.6 -0.2 -0.4 -4.0 -0.5
UK 2006 4.7 0.0 -0.1 0.0 1.9
2009 3.4 -1.5 -0.3 0.2 1.5
NO 2006
2009 7.4 -1.3 0.2 -1.7 4.5  
Source: 2009 Ageing Report. 
Note: Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. According to the revised pension projections, public 
pension expenditure is projected to decrease by 0.4 p.p. of GDP between 2007 and 2060. The revised projection 
is not included in this table.  
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Annex 10: Fiscal sustainability challenges arising from 
ageing populations 
 
Most recent assessment of long-term sustainability positions in EU Member States: 
sustainability indicators 
 
The starting point for the long-term projections was the budgetary projection for 2009 of the 
Commission’s spring 2009 forecasts (see the 2009 Sustainability Report). The S2 indicator is 
consistent with the concept of sustainability of public finances over an infinite horizon and is 
based on budgetary developments and on the most recent comparable information regarding 
the long-term impact of ageing populations on public expenditure.  
Alongside the S2 indicator, the relative value of the S1 indicator is considered as it gives an 
indication of the urgency of any necessary reforms. Where the S1 indicator is markedly lower 
than the S2, the satiability constraints will materialise further in the future and therefore 
allows the Member State a bit more time to implement the necessary reforms without risking 
as large an impact on their government gross debt. 
To make an overall assessment on the sustainability of public finances, other additional 
relevant factors are taken into account in order to better qualify the assessment with regard to 
where the main risks are likely to stem from and to consider the impact of relevant factors not 
(or not sufficiently) reflected in the sustainability indicators. Taking into account these other 
relevant factors may lead to a somehow different overall assessment than the one that would 
result from evaluating the sustainability indicators only.  
The level of the outstanding government debt is arguably the most important additional factor. 
Indeed, while the sustainability indicators already include information on the current level of 
debt, they do not incorporate all the specific risks faced by countries with a large initial level 
of debt. First, high-debt countries are more sensitive to short/medium term shocks to 
economic growth and to interest rates changes. Second, a high level of debt may lead to 
higher interest rate than assumed in the projections and increase further the risks to public 
finance sustainability. Third, when calculating the sustainability indicators, it is assumed that 
all countries are able keep their primary balance as a share of GDP at its current level in the 
future. High-debt countries need to maintain large primary surpluses for a prolonged period of 
time in order to reduce their debt ratio. This may prove difficult in view of other competing 
budgetary pressures. This factor is used symmetrically as a risk-increasing factor for very 
high debt countries (notably Belgium, Greece, Italy and Hungary) and a risk-decreasing factor 
for very low debt countries (notably Bulgaria, Estonia, Luxembourg and Romania). A note of 
caution is added to assessments of France, Portugal and United Kingdom, where the 
difficulties of the economic and financial crisis seem likely to add to their sustainability risk 
through high resulting levels of debt.  
A country's primary balance is also informative with regards to changes to its debt level. A 
negative primary balance is associated with a rising debt burden while a positive one with 
falling debt as a share of GDP. The Commission 2009 spring forecasts are used to look at the 
structural primary balance evolution over the years 2008 to 2010.  The forecast deterioration 
of the structural primary balance, is seen as risk increasing factor for eleven Member States 
(Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, Netherlands, Slovenia, Finland, Sweden 
and United Kingdom), of which three (Denmark, Latvia and UK) have a particularly marked 
deterioration which should be flagged as a strong risk-increasing factor. In the case of 
Denmark, however, the deterioration comes from a very healthy starting position. 
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The analysis of contingent liabilities is an increasingly important part of the budgetary 
surveillance process regarding the medium-term budgetary developments, as their stock is 
non-negligible and may entail significant fiscal risks. However, as data are scarce and only 
available on explicit contingent liabilities and as the distinction between explicit and implicit 
liabilities is not so clear-cut economically a level of caution must be exercised when 
determining the relative risks of different countries.  
The evolution of the benefit ratio is strongly driven by the pension system features and 
therefore by any reforms that have been enacted (see Chapter 2). A decrease in the public 
benefit ratio usually leads to a reduction (or slowdown) in government expenditure in 
pensions. However, it can also lead to other risks to public finances, if: (i) it leads to a 
substantial increase in the poverty rate of older people, which may require government 
assistance; (ii) moreover, the projected fall in the benefit ratio may be associated to a large 
increase in the relative share of social contributions that are diverted from social security or 
other public pension schemes to private schemes, which may affect public revenue. The 
sustainability indicators in Poland are clearly dependent on such a marked decrease in the 
benefit ratio that there is significant upward risk to the sustainability gap from political 
pressure. For Austria, Portugal and Sweden the decrease is also an additional risk. 
Conversely, the high and increasing benefit ratio for Greece must be seen an indication of the 
types of reforms that are necessary in the country to address its very large sustainability gap. 
The assessment is made fundamentally on the basis of a central demographic and 
macroeconomic scenario, which is further discussed in the Ageing report. However, 
sensitivity tests provide information on the robustness of the results with respect to changes in 
some key parameters. Also, different assumptions concerning the main drivers of expenditure 
can have a large impact on the size of the increase in age-related expenditures, for example 
concerning the income elasticity for health-care. There is therefore some uncertainty 
regarding the size of the sustainability challenge that EU countries are facing. Sensitivity tests 
illustrate the possible impact of different uncertainties materialising. 
A high current tax ratio leaves limited room of manoeuvre for using tax increases to finance 
additional public expenditure as compared to a lower tax ratio. This is the case for Belgium, 
Denmark, Italy and Sweden, with Belgium combining a high tax ratio with a need to reduce 
its very high debt.  By contrast, low tax ratios are not considered to be a risk-reducing factor, 
since a possible decision regarding an increase of the tax ratio would not only take into 
account the financing needs resulting from ageing but would depend on the size of public 
procurement of good and services, the effectiveness of tax systems, the structure of the tax 
system and its impact on growth. 
Table 8 presents an assessment of the long-term risks associated with the S2 indicator and 
lists the main additional factors that are taken into account when reaching an overall 
assessment for the 27 Member States. The relationship between the overall classification and 
the S2 indicator is shown in Figure 23 which indicates that in general, the synthetic S2 
indicator summarises the overall degree of long-term risks well. Specifically, the overall 
assessment is different from an assessment that would be based solely on the value of the S2 
indicator in the main scenario in a few cases, namely: Both Italy and Hungary are deemed to 
be at medium long-term risk despite a low S2 indicator due mainly to their very high debt and 
in the case of Italy also to its high tax ratio. Despite a very large sustainability gap, 
Luxembourg is assessed as being at medium long-term risk due to its low level of debt, the 
large level of assets and the significantly lower S1 indicator which allows it some more time 
to correct its gap than would be the case with a higher S1. 
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Table 8 – Main factors considered in reaching an overall assessment of the public finance sustainability 
risks 
 
S2 indicator Level of debt
Change in the structural 
primary balance tax ratio
Difference 
between the S1 
and S2 
indicators
Benefit 
ratio
Overall 
assessment
Baseline 2009 2008 - 2010 %change
BE medium very high – medium
BG low very low low
CZ high low high
DK low low – – – low
DE medium high – medium
EE low very low low
IE high high – high
EL high very high high
ES high medium – high
FR medium high medium
IT low very high – medium
CY high medium – + high
LV high low – – high
LT high low high
LU high very low + medium
HU low very high medium
MT high high high
NL high medium – high
AT medium high – medium
PL medium medium – medium
PT medium high – medium
RO high very low high
SI high low – high
SK high low high
FI medium low – low
SE low medium – – – low
UK high high – – high  
Source: Commission services.  
Note: Note: '-' factor tends to increase the risk to long-term sustainability, '+' factor tends to decrease the risk to 
long-term sustainability. 
Finland is assessed to be low long-term risk, though the projected increase on age-related 
expenditure is substantial and the fiscal cost of the crisis has been large. However, the large 
stock of financial assets in the government’s portfolio (above 100 percent of GDP) provides a 
cushion to absorb the crisis-related deterioration in government accounts. 
It should be noted that countries with different characteristics can overall face a similar degree 
of risks to fiscal sustainability. For example, the projected cost of ageing in BE is high while 
the budgetary position is relatively sound, with a small structural primary deficit and a very 
high level of government debt. By contrast, PL, which is in the same medium long-term risk 
category, has a projected cost of ageing which marginally improves its long-term 
sustainability while its sustainability difficulties arise from its weak budgetary position. 
Despite having the same classification and S2 gaps within 2 percentage points of GDP of each 
other, the priorities are different; PL needs to consolidate its public finances once the upswing 
is underway and the time is right, while BE might consider appropriate introducing measures 
to curb the projected high increase in age-related expenditure.  
An overall assessment of risks to the long-term sustainability of public finances is given in the 
following section for the 27 Member States. 
Figure 20 – Overall risk classification and the sustainability gaps (S2 and S1 in the baseline scenario) 
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The budgetary impact of ageing populations is a concern for the sustainability of public 
finances in all EU Member States. There is however a large variation in the degree of risks 
that they are facing and where they mainly come from. This section summarises the different 
risks that the EU Member States are facing with regard to the long-term sustainability of the 
public finances. Overall, thirteen countries are assessed to be at high risk, nine at medium risk 
and five at low risk. Compared with the results of the 2006 Sustainability Report, ten Member 
States are in a higher risk category, while two are in lower risk group.  
Low long-term risk countries 
Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Sweden have in general come furthest in coping with 
ageing, which implies a strong budgetary position (running large surpluses prior to the crisis, 
reducing debt and/or accumulating assets) and/or comprehensive pension reforms, sometimes 
including a shift towards private funded pension schemes, and present therefore a low long-
term risk. 
Of these countries, Finland has an above average projected increase in age-related expenditure 
over the long-term. Although, the large stock of public financial assets provides a buffer 
against the negative budgetary impacts of the crisis.  
For Bulgaria, Denmark, Estonia and Sweden the forecast increases in age-related expenditure 
are amongst the lowest in EU and their budgetary positions are either in or close to surplus. 
This does not mean that in these countries there are no risks regarding the long-term 
sustainability of public finances however, but that their social protection systems (pension and 
healthcare) at present appear able to deal with the pressures of an ageing population on 
current estimates. In particular, in case of Bulgaria and Estonia, a positive impact of low debt 
level and implemented pension reforms should be seen in the context of the ongoing 
convergence to the levels observed in the rest of EU. 
Medium long-term risk countries 
The intermediate group of countries (Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Hungary, Austria, Poland and Portugal) consists of Member States with very different 
characteristics but three distinct categories can be distinguished: 
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Belgium, Germany, Austria are countries with a significant cost of ageing and where 
measures might be needed to curb these costs, but which currently have relatively strong 
budgetary positions. For these countries, reforms to address the rising cost of ageing are a 
priority and these can be undertaken without waiting for the end of the financial crisis, insofar 
as the reforms do not adversely affect the recovery. This is also the case for Luxembourg 
which faces the highest increase in age-related expenditure of all EU countries, but which is 
included in the medium long-term risk category due to its low level of debt, high stock of 
assets and lower ageing costs at the beginning of the period as shown by its lower S1 
indicator. For Belgium, the strong budgetary position in recent years is counterweighted by 
very high levels of debt ratio-to-GDP which is forecast to reach 100% by 2010. Nevertheless, 
Belgium is assessed to present medium long-term risk because of its track record of running 
consistently high primary surpluses over time and reduce its debt when the economy is not in 
crisis.  
France, Poland, and Portugal are countries that need to consolidate, though to different 
degrees, their public finances over the medium-term but for which the costs of ageing are 
relatively less of a concern, usually as a result of reforms made to their pension systems. It 
may be that the government accounts improve when the recovery comes, but where this is not 
the case budgetary consolidation will be necessary and should be undertaken as soon as the 
time is right in order to reduce risks to public finance sustainability. In Poland’s and 
Portugal’s cases, there is an added risk in relation to the sharp reduction in the benefit ratio. 
For Italy and Hungary neither the budgetary position nor the long term cost of ageing are 
particularly high. However the initial levels of debt give cause for concern. In both Italy and 
Hungary, rapid budgetary consolidation is required to ensure a steady reduction of the 
currently very high level of debt, although it will need to be undertaken at a time when it does 
not adversely affect the recovery from the economic and financial crisis.  
High long-term risk countries 
This category of countries (Czech Republic, Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Malta, Netherlands, Romania, Slovenia, Slovakia and United Kingdom) are 
characterised by a very significant rise in age-related expenditure over the long-term, 
underlining that measures aimed at curbing them will prove necessary. Of these, Latvia is the 
exception, where age-related expenditure is forecast to be just 1.3 percentage points (p.p.) of 
GDP higher in 2060 compared with 2010. For Greece and Slovenia (as well as Luxembourg) 
the increase in these expenditures is over 10 p.p. of GDP.  
Conversely, Romania is characterised by very low levels of debt which stand at below 20% of 
GDP, while for Czech Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia debt ratios stand at 
below 40%. At the other end of the spectrum, Greece has a government dent of nearly 100% 
of GDP, which is combined with one of the highest increases in age-related expenditure 
grouping the whole EU. Latvia, while characterised by very low debt levels, is forecast to 
have a very large increase in debt by 2010.  
For most of the Member States in this high long-term risk category it will be necessary to 
address both the long-term costs of ageing through reforms to pension systems and the 
weakness of the initial budgetary positions. For some Member States the deficits may return 
to surplus when the recovery comes, but where this is not the case budgetary consolidation 
will be necessary and should be undertaken as soon as the time is right in order to reduce risks 
to public finance sustainability. 
Conversely, the reforms to the pension and healthcare system which will not adversely affect 
the recovery of the Member States' economies should be approached with urgency. This is 
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particularly the case for countries where age related expenditure is a significant challange: 
Ireland, Greece, Spain, Cyprus, Malta, Netherlands, Romania and Slovenia. As not all pension 
and healthcare reforms are neutral with respect to the recovery, care should be taken to 
consider the effect of any changes undertaken. 
Within the high long-term risk countries, the case of Cyprus should also be noted. Thanks to 
successful consolidation in the pre-crisis years, Cyprus managed to significantly reduce its 
debt ratio. Moreover, although the planned increases in age-related expenditure is very large, 
its demographic projections are such that the increase in ageing-related expenditure will be 
relatively contained in the first half of the projection horizon. 
 
Changes in sustainability positions in the last decade  
 
The results in this report differ significantly from those presented three years ago in the 2006 
Sustainability Report. While the EU-25 average sustainability gap was estimated 3.4% of 
GDP on S2, the current estimates are for 6.5% of GDP. 
Figure 21 compares the S2 indicator calculated in this report with the one of 2006. The 
difference between S2 in the 2006 and 2009 reports is split in three components: (i) the 
difference that is due to changes in the initial budgetary position, (ii) the difference that owes 
to the revision in the long-term projection of age-related expenditure because of new 
demographic projections and a number of improvements in the projection methods, and (iii) 
the fact that the long-term projections have been extended from 2050 to 2060. 
On average, the sustainability gap has increased by 3.1 percentage points (p.p.) of GDP for 
the 25 countries that were members of the EU in 2006. While 4 Member States (Hungary, 
Portugal, Italy and Germany) show a lower sustainability gap than in the 2006 exercise, the 
remaining 21 Member States show a deterioration. Of these, in all cases expect Luxembourg, 
Greece and Malta, the deterioration is essentially due to a weakening of the initial budgetary 
position rather than to an increase in the age-related costs and the delay in the required 
adjustment that leads to a higher LTC. For Ireland, Spain, Latvia and UK the weakened initial 
budgetary position is responsible for an increase of the estimated sustainability gap of over 5 
points.  
Overall, for the EU-25 countries, the deterioration in S2 is due to the worsening in the starting 
budgetary position. The required adjustment given the starting position has increase by 3.2 
p.p. of GDP between the 2006 and 2009 reports, as the base year for the analysis changed 
from 2005 to 2009. The fiscal impact of the economic and financial crisis is therefore 
included in the 2009 estimates and explains the worse initial budgetary position.  
Conversely, there has been a slight improvement by 0.1 p.p. of GDP in the LTC component of 
S2. Almost half of Member States show an improvement on this component. Notable outliers 
are Luxembourg, Malta and Greece where changes in the estimate of the LTC are equal to 
3.6, 4.6 and 9.9 points, respectively. In Greece's case, this is largely explained by the fact that 
the 2006 estimates did not include pension expenditure as projections were not available at 
that time. For Luxembourg, the required adjustment given the long-term costs (LTC) now 
takes into account the pension expenditure that should be paid out to non-residents, while in 
2006 this was omitted.  
 
Figure 21 – LTC component of the S2 indicator until 2050 and 2060 
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Table 9 –S2 indicator in the baseline scenario compared to the results of the 2006 Sustainability Report 
S2 
until 2050 until 2060 until 2060
BE 4.6 4.8 0.1 5.3
BG 1.1 1.5 0.4 0.9
CZ 2.9 3.7 0.8 7.4
DK 1.8 1.4 -0.4 -0.2
DE 3.0 3.3 0.3 4.2
EE -0.2 -0.1 0.0 1.0
IE 5.3 6.7 1.4 15.0
EL 10.8 11.5 0.7 14.1
ES 5.4 5.7 0.4 11.8
FR 1.9 1.8 -0.1 5.6
IT 1.9 1.5 -0.5 1.4
CY 6.6 8.3 1.6 8.8
LV 1.0 1.0 0.0 9.9
LT 2.6 3.2 0.6 7.1
LU 11.9 12.9 1.0 12.5
HU 1.0 1.5 0.5 -0.1
MT 4.5 5.7 1.2 7.0
NL 5.0 5.0 0.0 6.9
AT 3.1 3.1 0.0 4.7
PL -1.3 -1.2 0.0 3.2
PT 1.6 1.9 0.3 5.5
RO 4.4 4.9 0.5 9.1
SI 7.7 8.3 0.7 12.2
SK 2.3 2.9 0.6 7.4
FI 4.3 4.5 0.2 4.0
SE 1.2 1.6 0.4 1.8
UK 2.6 3.6 0.9 12.4
EU27 2.9 3.2 0.3 6.5
EA 3.4 3.5 0.1 5.8
LTC Difference in LTC 
2050 - 2060
 
Source: Commission services.  
Table 9 shows the LTC component of the S2 indicator calculated until 2050 and 2060, as well 
as the difference between the two and the S2 sustainability gap. It aims to complement the 
analysis presented in Figure 24 by showing the evolution of the LTC due to the increase in 
expenditure in the years after 2050. The figures show that on average there is little difference 
between the LTC until 2050 and until 2060. For EU-27 the difference equals 0.3 points on 
average, while for the Euro Area, the difference is 0.1 p.p. of GDP. Little of the difference 
between the results presented in this report and those presented in the 2006 Sustainability 
Report can therefore be attributed to the additional costs of ageing beyond 2050. However, it 
suggests that, on the basis of current projections, the ratio-to-GDP of age-related expenditure 
will keep increasing beyond 2060 for most. However, it should be noted that the relationship 
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between the cost of ageing and the LTC depends on the discount rates and the time profile of 
the spending increases. For individual Member States, however, there is more variation with 
some such as Ireland, Cyprus and Malta having a significant increase in their sustainability 
gap due to the effect of the additional costs of ageing beyond 2050. 
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Annex 11: Methodological issues and the Aggregate 
Replacement Ratio 
 
The focus of this indicator is on "the transition in income status of the individual" arising 
from working to retirement. Consequently, it refers to specific individual income components 
that, by definition, are recorded as gross components in EU-SILC. Those countries currently 
unable to supply the relevant gross income components provide results based on the 
corresponding net income components. From the 2007 data collection onwards, this indicator 
is calculated on the basis of gross income in all countries. For the relevant countries, this 
transition from net to gross is marked as a break in series.  
Equivalisation is not performed on gross income, because it is inappropriate.  
Compared to the median relative income ratio, the aggregate replacement ratio, is more 
narrow in scope. This applies both to the income concept as to the age groups that are 
considered. In the calculation of the aggregate replacement ratio, income of elderly is 
restricted to pensions; income of the younger age group is limited to earnings. For the median 
relative income ratio, all sources of income are considered.  
Moreover, the median relative income ratio considers two broad age groups (0 to 64 
compared to population aged 65 or over), whereas the aggregate replacement ratio focuses on 
the population aged 65 -74 for the elderly and the population aged 50-59 for the younger age 
group.  
Gender differences in the aggregate replacement ratio need to be interpreted carefully, 
particularly in relation to earnings of women aged 50-59. For example, if the female 
aggregate replacement ratio is higher than for males, this does not necessarily refer to a 
pension policy issue.  
The aggregate replacement ratio is a crude measure of comparison of the pension income of 
individuals in the upper age group and the income from work of persons in the lower age 
group. Deliberately, no account is taken of other income sources like investment income or 
social transfers between households.  
This aggregate calculation does compare the situation of the same individuals before and after 
the cut-off age. Moreover, as this calculation is done using non-equivalised income, no 
account is taken of differences in household composition or size, which may affect the 
adequacy of the income.  
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Annex 12: European Commission spring 2010 forecast - 
main variables 
 
 
Table 10 – GDP growth, EU Member States  
 
           SPRING 2010 FORECASTS
  MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1992 - 2011
 (a)  GDP at constant prices (annual % change)
Scenario
   5-year Estimates Forecasts unchanged
   averages policies
1992-96 1997-01 2002-06 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 BE 1,5 2,7 2,0 1,8 2,8 2,9 1,0 -3,1 1,3 1,6 BE
 DE 1,4 2,1 1,0 0,8 3,2 2,5 1,3 -5,0 1,2 1,6 DE
 IE 5,9 9,1 5,4 6,2 5,4 6,0 -3,0 -7,1 -0,9 3,0 IE
 EL 1,1 3,8 4,1 2,2 4,5 4,5 2,0 -2,0 -3,0 -0,5 EL
 ES 1,5 4,4 3,3 3,6 4,0 3,6 0,9 -3,6 -0,4 0,8 ES
 FR 1,2 3,0 1,7 1,9 2,2 2,3 0,4 -2,2 1,3 1,5 FR
 IT 1,2 2,0 0,9 0,7 2,0 1,5 -1,3 -5,0 0,8 1,4 IT
 CY 5,5 4,2 3,3 3,9 4,1 5,1 3,6 -1,7 -0,4 1,3 CY
 LU 2,6 6,3 4,2 5,4 5,6 6,5 0,0 -3,4 2,0 2,4 LU
 MT 5,0 3,4 2,1 3,9 3,6 3,8 2,1 -1,9 1,1 1,7 MT
 NL 2,5 3,7 1,6 2,0 3,4 3,6 2,0 -4,0 1,3 1,8 NL
 AT 1,8 2,6 2,2 2,5 3,5 3,5 2,0 -3,6 1,3 1,6 AT
 PT 2,0 3,8 0,7 0,9 1,4 1,9 0,0 -2,7 0,5 0,7 PT
 SI 2,0 4,2 4,3 4,5 5,8 6,8 3,5 -7,8 1,1 1,8 SI
 SK - 2,7 5,9 6,7 8,5 10,6 6,2 -4,7 2,7 3,6 SK
 FI 1,3 4,5 3,0 2,9 4,4 4,9 1,2 -7,8 1,4 2,1 FI
 € area 1,5 2,8 1,7 1,7 3,0 2,8 0,6 -4,1 0,9 1,5 € area
 BG -2,8 2,0 5,7 6,2 6,3 6,2 6,0 -5,0 0,0 2,7 BG
 CZ 2,3 1,2 4,6 6,3 6,8 6,1 2,5 -4,2 1,6 2,4 CZ
 DK 2,6 2,4 1,8 2,4 3,4 1,7 -0,9 -4,9 1,6 1,8 DK
 EE - 7,0 8,4 9,4 10,0 7,2 -3,6 -14,1 0,9 3,8 EE
 LV -8,8 6,3 9,0 10,6 12,2 10,0 -4,6 -18,0 -3,5 3,3 LV
 LT -8,3 4,7 8,0 7,8 7,8 9,8 2,8 -15,0 -0,6 3,2 LT
 HU 0,6 4,6 4,2 3,5 4,0 1,0 0,6 -6,3 0,0 2,8 HU
 PL 4,9 4,4 4,1 3,6 6,2 6,8 5,0 1,7 2,7 3,3 PL
 RO 1,4 -0,9 6,2 4,2 7,9 6,3 7,3 -7,1 0,8 3,5 RO
 SE 1,2 3,3 3,2 3,3 4,2 2,5 -0,2 -4,9 1,8 2,5 SE
 UK 2,5 3,4 2,6 2,2 2,9 2,6 0,5 -4,9 1,2 2,1 UK
 EU 1,4 2,9 2,0 2,0 3,2 2,9 0,7 -4,2 1,0 1,7 EU
 US 3,3 3,8 2,7 3,1 2,7 2,1 0,4 -2,4 2,8 2,5 US
 JP 1,3 0,5 1,7 1,9 2,0 2,4 -1,2 -5,2 2,1 1,5 JP  
Source: Commission services 
 
 52
Table 11 – Labour market developments, EU Member States  
           SPRING 2010 FORECASTS
  MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1992 - 2011
 (c)  Total employment (annual % change)
Scenario
   5-year Estimates Forecasts unchanged
   averages policies
1992-96 1997-01 2002-06 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 BE 0,1 1,4 0,7 1,4 1,2 1,6 1,9 -0,5 -0,9 0,2  BE
 DE -1,4 0,0 -0,7 -0,6 0,2 1,5 1,4 0,0 -0,3 -0,1  DE
 IE 2,5 5,6 3,2 4,9 4,3 3,7 -1,1 -8,2 -3,5 0,4  IE
 EL 0,9 0,7 1,7 0,9 2,0 1,4 0,1 -1,2 -1,9 -0,8  EL
 ES -0,3 4,1 2,8 3,2 3,3 2,8 -0,6 -6,7 -2,5 -0,1  ES
 FR -0,5 1,7 0,5 0,6 1,0 1,5 0,6 -1,3 -0,7 0,3  FR
 IT -0,9 1,1 0,8 0,2 1,5 1,0 -0,1 -2,7 -0,7 0,4  IT
 CY - 1,6 3,0 3,6 1,8 3,2 2,6 -0,7 -0,7 -0,2  CY
 LU 2,5 4,7 2,8 2,9 3,6 4,4 4,7 0,9 0,0 0,7  LU
 MT 1,5 0,8 0,7 1,5 1,3 3,2 2,5 -0,6 0,3 0,7  MT
 NL 1,0 2,4 -0,2 0,0 1,6 2,3 1,2 -0,9 -1,6 -0,2  NL
 AT 0,0 0,8 0,5 1,2 1,0 1,6 1,8 -0,9 -0,1 0,2  AT
 PT -0,8 2,1 0,0 -0,3 0,5 0,0 0,4 -2,5 -0,5 0,0  PT
 SI - 0,2 0,5 -0,2 1,5 3,0 2,8 -2,2 -2,3 -0,5  SI
 SK - -1,1 0,9 1,4 2,3 2,1 2,8 -2,4 -1,9 1,2  SK
 FI -2,3 2,2 0,9 1,4 1,8 2,2 1,6 -3,0 -2,1 0,4  FI
 € area -0,6 1,4 0,6 0,7 1,4 1,7 0,6 -2,1 -1,0 0,1  € area
 BG 0,3 -2,3 2,4 2,7 3,3 2,8 3,3 -2,9 -1,2 0,6  BG
 CZ - -0,9 0,5 1,0 1,9 2,7 1,2 -1,2 -1,9 0,4  CZ
 DK 0,1 1,0 0,3 1,0 2,1 2,9 1,4 -3,6 -1,9 -0,1  DK
 EE -5,2 -1,4 2,0 2,0 5,4 0,8 0,2 -9,9 -2,6 1,5  EE
 LV -7,4 0,0 2,5 1,6 4,9 3,6 0,9 -13,6 -7,2 0,8  LV
 LT -2,7 -2,1 2,0 2,5 1,8 2,8 -0,5 -6,9 -3,6 0,2  LT
 HU - 3,3 -0,2 -0,2 0,6 -0,3 -1,3 -3,6 -0,9 0,8  HU
 PL - -1,1 0,5 2,2 3,2 4,4 3,8 0,4 0,0 0,6  PL
 RO -2,8 -2,5 -2,6 -1,5 0,7 0,4 -0,2 -1,0 -1,7 0,8  RO
 SE -1,9 1,4 0,1 0,3 1,7 2,2 0,9 -2,0 -0,9 0,3  SE
 UK 0,0 1,2 0,9 1,0 0,9 0,7 0,7 -1,6 -0,3 0,7  UK
 EU - 0,8 0,5 0,8 1,5 1,7 0,9 -2,0 -0,9 0,3  EU
 US 1,8 1,7 0,6 1,3 2,1 1,1 -0,5 -3,8 -0,4 0,6  US
 JP 0,4 -0,6 -0,2 0,4 0,4 0,4 -0,3 -1,6 -1,0 -0,2  JP
 
 (d)  Number of unemployed (as % of the labour force)
Scenario
   5-year Estimates Forecasts unchanged
   averages policies
1992-96 1997-01 2002-06 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 BE 8,9 8,1 8,2 8,5 8,3 7,5 7,0 7,9 8,8 9,0  BE
 DE 7,8 8,4 9,6 10,7 9,8 8,4 7,3 7,5 7,8 7,8  DE
 IE 13,9 6,2 4,5 4,4 4,5 4,6 6,3 11,9 13,8 13,4  IE
 EL 8,8 10,9 9,9 9,9 8,9 8,3 7,7 9,5 11,8 13,2  EL
 ES 17,8 13,1 10,1 9,2 8,5 8,3 11,3 18,0 19,7 19,8  ES
 FR 11,0 10,0 9,1 9,3 9,2 8,4 7,8 9,5 10,2 10,1  FR
 IT 10,3 10,5 7,9 7,7 6,8 6,1 6,7 7,8 8,8 8,8  IT
 CY - 3,8 4,5 5,3 4,6 4,0 3,6 5,3 6,7 7,0  CY
 LU 2,7 2,4 4,1 4,6 4,6 4,2 4,9 5,4 6,1 6,4  LU
 MT 5,2 6,8 7,4 7,2 7,1 6,4 5,9 6,9 7,3 7,2  MT
 NL 6,2 3,4 3,9 4,7 3,9 3,2 2,8 3,4 4,9 5,2  NL
 AT 3,9 4,0 4,7 5,2 4,8 4,4 3,8 4,8 5,1 5,4  AT
 PT 6,2 4,9 6,7 7,7 7,8 8,1 7,7 9,6 9,9 9,9  PT
 SI - 6,9 6,4 6,5 6,0 4,9 4,4 5,9 7,0 7,3  SI
 SK - 15,8 16,8 16,3 13,4 11,1 9,5 12,0 14,1 13,3  SK
 FI 14,9 10,6 8,6 8,4 7,7 6,9 6,4 8,2 9,5 9,2  FI
 € area 10,2 9,3 8,7 9,0 8,3 7,5 7,5 9,4 10,3 10,4  € area
 BG 13,8 15,7 12,6 10,1 9,0 6,9 5,6 6,8 7,9 7,3  BG
 CZ - 7,3 7,7 7,9 7,2 5,3 4,4 6,7 8,3 8,0  CZ
 DK 7,8 4,8 4,8 4,8 3,9 3,8 3,3 6,0 6,9 6,5  DK
 EE - 11,3 8,8 7,9 5,9 4,7 5,5 13,8 15,8 14,6  EE
 LV 13,8 14,0 9,8 8,9 6,8 6,0 7,5 17,1 20,6 18,8  LV
 LT 5,0 13,3 10,3 8,3 5,6 4,3 5,8 13,7 16,7 16,3  LT
 HU - 7,3 6,5 7,2 7,5 7,4 7,8 10,0 10,8 10,1  HU
 PL 13,4 13,8 18,1 17,8 13,9 9,6 7,1 8,2 9,2 9,4  PL
 RO 5,8 6,4 7,6 7,2 7,3 6,4 5,8 6,9 8,5 7,9  RO
 SE 8,5 7,2 7,0 7,7 7,0 6,1 6,2 8,3 9,2 8,8  SE
 UK 9,1 5,8 5,0 4,8 5,4 5,3 5,6 7,6 7,8 7,4  UK
 EU - 8,8 8,8 8,9 8,2 7,1 7,0 8,9 9,8 9,7  EU
 US 6,3 4,5 5,4 5,1 4,6 4,6 5,8 9,3 9,7 9,8  US
 JP 2,8 4,4 4,8 4,4 4,1 3,9 4,0 5,1 5,3 5,3  JP
Note : - As usual, the forecasts are conditioned upon, inter alia, the technical assumption of 'no policy change'.
             This means that specific policy measures, especially in the budgetary field, which have not yet been disclosed are not taken
             into account. As a result, projections for 2011 are essentially an extrapolation of present trends.  
Source: Commission services 
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Table 12 – Public finances, EU Member States  
           SPRING 2010 FORECASTS
  MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1992 - 2011
 (g)  General government net lending (+) or borrowing (-) (as a % of GDP) (1)
Scenario
   5-year Estimates Forecasts unchanged
   averages policies
1992-96 1997-01 2002-06 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 BE -5,4 -0,7 -0,6 -2,7 0,3 -0,2 -1,2 -6,0 -5,0 -5,0  BE
 DE -3,0 -1,6 -3,3 -3,3 -1,6 0,2 0,0 -3,3 -5,0 -4,7  DE
 IE -1,7 2,4 1,2 1,6 3,0 0,1 -7,3 -14,3 -11,7 -12,1  IE
 EL -9,6 -4,2 -5,3 -5,2 -3,6 -5,1 -7,7 -13,6 -9,3 -9,9  EL
 ES -5,6 -1,9 0,4 1,0 2,0 1,9 -4,1 -11,2 -9,8 -8,8  ES
 FR -4,9 -2,1 -3,2 -2,9 -2,3 -2,7 -3,3 -7,5 -8,0 -7,4  FR
 IT -8,3 -2,2 -3,5 -4,3 -3,3 -1,5 -2,7 -5,3 -5,3 -5,0  IT
 CY - -3,6 -3,7 -2,4 -1,2 3,4 0,9 -6,1 -7,1 -7,7  CY
 LU 1,6 4,5 0,6 0,0 1,4 3,6 2,9 -0,7 -3,5 -3,9  LU
 MT - -7,6 -5,1 -2,9 -2,6 -2,2 -4,5 -3,8 -4,3 -3,6  MT
 NL -3,3 0,0 -1,3 -0,3 0,5 0,2 0,7 -5,3 -6,3 -5,1  NL
 AT -4,1 -1,6 -1,9 -1,7 -1,5 -0,4 -0,4 -3,4 -4,7 -4,6  AT
 PT -4,7 -3,4 -3,8 -6,1 -3,9 -2,6 -2,8 -9,4 -8,5 -7,9  PT
 SI - -3,1 -2,0 -1,4 -1,3 0,0 -1,7 -5,5 -6,1 -5,2  SI
 SK - -7,6 -3,9 -2,8 -3,5 -1,9 -2,3 -6,8 -6,0 -5,4  SK
 FI -5,8 2,7 3,1 2,7 4,0 5,2 4,2 -2,2 -3,8 -2,9  FI
 € area -5,0 -1,6 -2,5 -2,5 -1,3 -0,6 -2,0 -6,3 -6,6 -6,1  € area
 BG - 1,4 1,1 1,9 3,0 0,1 1,8 -3,9 -2,8 -2,2  BG
 CZ - -4,4 -4,5 -3,6 -2,6 -0,7 -2,7 -5,9 -5,7 -5,7  CZ
 DK -2,5 0,9 2,6 5,2 5,2 4,8 3,4 -2,7 -5,5 -4,9  DK
 EE - -0,5 1,5 1,6 2,5 2,6 -2,7 -1,7 -2,4 -2,4  EE
 LV - -1,5 -1,2 -0,4 -0,5 -0,3 -4,1 -9,0 -8,6 -9,9  LV
 LT - -4,9 -1,1 -0,5 -0,4 -1,0 -3,3 -8,9 -8,4 -8,5  LT
 HU - -5,3 -8,0 -7,9 -9,3 -5,0 -3,8 -4,0 -4,1 -4,0  HU
 PL - -3,9 -4,9 -4,1 -3,6 -1,9 -3,7 -7,1 -7,3 -7,0  PL
 RO - -4,0 -1,6 -1,2 -2,2 -2,5 -5,4 -8,3 -8,0 -7,4  RO
 SE -7,7 1,2 0,7 2,3 2,5 3,8 2,5 -0,5 -2,1 -1,6  SE
 UK -6,1 0,5 -3,0 -3,4 -2,7 -2,8 -4,9 -11,5 -12,0 -10,0  UK
 EU - -1,4 -2,5 -2,5 -1,4 -0,8 -2,3 -6,8 -7,2 -6,5  EU
 US -4,2 0,3 -3,7 -3,2 -2,0 -2,7 -6,4 -11,0 -10,0 -9,9  US
 JP -2,5 -7,3 -6,1 -6,7 -1,6 -2,5 -2,0 -6,9 -6,7 -6,6  JP
 (1)  The net lending (borrowing) includes in 2000-2005 one-off proceeds relative to UMTS licences.
 (h)  General government gross debt (as a % of GDP)
Scenario
Estimates Forecasts unchanged
policies
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
 BE 103,5 98,5 94,2 92,1 88,1 84,2 89,8 96,7 99,0 100,9  BE
 DE 60,4 63,9 65,7 68,0 67,6 65,0 66,0 73,2 78,8 81,6  DE
 IE 32,2 31,0 29,7 27,6 24,9 25,0 43,9 64,0 77,3 87,3  IE
 EL 101,7 97,4 98,6 100,0 97,8 95,7 99,2 115,1 124,9 133,9  EL
 ES 52,5 48,7 46,2 43,0 39,6 36,2 39,7 53,2 64,9 72,5  ES
 FR 58,8 62,9 64,9 66,4 63,7 63,8 67,5 77,6 83,6 88,6  FR
 IT 105,7 104,4 103,8 105,8 106,5 103,5 106,1 115,8 118,2 118,9  IT
 CY 64,6 68,9 70,2 69,1 64,6 58,3 48,4 56,2 62,3 67,6  CY
 LU 6,3 6,1 6,3 6,1 6,5 6,7 13,7 14,5 19,0 23,6  LU
 MT 60,1 69,3 72,3 70,1 63,7 61,9 63,7 69,1 71,5 72,5  MT
 NL 50,5 52,0 52,4 51,8 47,4 45,5 58,2 60,9 66,3 69,6  NL
 AT 66,5 65,5 64,8 63,9 62,2 59,5 62,6 66,5 70,2 72,9  AT
 PT 55,6 56,9 58,3 63,6 64,7 63,6 66,3 76,8 85,8 91,1  PT
 SI 28,0 27,5 27,2 27,0 26,7 23,4 22,6 35,9 41,6 45,4  SI
 SK 43,4 42,4 41,5 34,2 30,5 29,3 27,7 35,7 40,8 44,0  SK
 FI 41,5 44,5 44,4 41,7 39,7 35,2 34,2 44,0 50,5 54,9  FI
 € area 68,0 69,1 69,5 70,1 68,3 66,0 69,4 78,7 84,7 88,5  € area
 BG 53,6 45,9 37,9 29,2 22,7 18,2 14,1 14,8 17,4 18,8  BG
 CZ 28,2 29,8 30,1 29,7 29,4 29,0 30,0 35,4 39,8 43,5  CZ
 DK 48,3 45,8 44,5 37,1 32,1 27,4 34,2 41,6 46,0 49,5  DK
 EE 5,7 5,6 5,0 4,6 4,5 3,8 4,6 7,2 9,6 12,4  EE
 LV 13,5 14,6 14,9 12,4 10,7 9,0 19,5 36,1 48,5 57,3  LV
 LT 22,3 21,1 19,4 18,4 18,0 16,9 15,6 29,3 38,6 45,4  LT
 HU 55,6 58,4 59,1 61,8 65,6 65,9 72,9 78,3 78,9 77,8  HU
 PL 42,2 47,1 45,7 47,1 47,7 45,0 47,2 51,0 53,9 59,3  PL
 RO 24,9 21,5 18,7 15,8 12,4 12,6 13,3 23,7 30,5 35,8  RO
 SE 52,6 52,3 51,1 50,8 45,7 40,8 38,3 42,3 42,6 42,1  SE
 UK 37,5 38,7 40,6 42,2 43,5 44,7 52,0 68,1 79,1 86,9  UK
 EU 60,4 61,8 62,2 62,7 61,4 58,8 61,6 73,6 79,6 83,8  EU
Note : - As usual, the forecasts are conditioned upon, inter alia, the technical assumption of 'no policy change'.
             This means that specific policy measures, especially in the budgetary field, which have not yet been disclosed are not taken
             into account. As a result, projections for 2011 are essentially an extrapolation of present trends.  
Source: Commission services 
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Figure 22 – General government finances, EU  
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and West Germany. Former EU-15 from 1978 to 1996, EU-27 since 1997.  
Source: Commission services 
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Annex 13: The potential impact of the crisis 
 
The potential long-term impact of the current economic crisis 
Drastically deteriorated economic developments – and prospects – in the wake of the crisis 
add to the uncertainty as regards the buoyancy of economic growth in a medium- to long-term 
perspective. The economic crisis that took hold in 2008 has led to an unusually sharp and 
rapid deterioration in economic activity. The current slowdown has gradually transformed 
into a world recession. This has prompted the question of the extent to which the worsened 
short-term outlook would have implications for the growth potential of the EU economies also 
over the medium- and longer-term.17 
There is a risk that the recovery will be characterised by a protracted period of weak potential 
GDP growth due to: 
− Wide-ranging lack of confidence, which could lead to postpone household consumption 
and efficient and profitable investments by firms; 
− Real economy effects of balance sheet adjustment in the financial sector; downsizing of 
banks' assets including writing off "impaired" or "toxic" assets, is likely to push up the cost of 
capital even in the presence of large recapitalisation packages;  
− Pervasive credit constraints and higher borrowing costs in the non-financial sector in 
light of the restructuring of banks; generally in the EU, deleveraging needs for households are 
lower than in the US, but firms are more heavily indebted than in the US. A persistent credit 
squeeze was one of the key factors of the long Japanese slump recorded in the 1990s and 
2000s;  
− A persistent impact on the EU's growth potential might occur if there is a shift in the 
attitude to risk and a structurally and permanently higher cost of capital;  
− Slower growth in (total factor) productivity in the short and medium terms, induced by 
the reduction in ICT investment and knowledge-based investment such as R&D. this 
postponement of key innovation-prone investments may have a lasting effect on productivity 
and growth;  
− Permanent destruction in human capital caused by a surge in long-term unemployment 
induced by a protracted slowdown that might be aggravated by sluggish market adjustment in 
the EU. This permanent negative effect in terms of "know-how" or professional knowledge 
gives rise to the so-called "hysteresis" effect; 
− The collapse of world trade poses risks for a higher degree of protectionism. Given the 
global nature of the recession, an eventual revival of growth would require a rebalancing of 
growth from high-leverage countries to low-leverage countries. Failing to achieve such a 
rebalancing would have an adverse impact on EU growth, especially for export-oriented 
countries. 
 
 
                                                 
17 It should be borne in mind that estimating potential output growth is subject to uncertainty and that different 
methods for doing so exists. While in principle only structural factors matter for the estimation of the growth 
potential, it is very difficult to distinguish cyclical and structural factors in real time. This is all the more the case 
in times of rapid changes in economic activity, like for instance at the current juncture. For this reason, real-time 
estimates of potential growth, and of GDP output gaps, need to be interpreted with caution. 
 56
Scenarios for potential GDP growth in view of the economic crisis 
The AWG/EPC baseline long-term macro-economic projections for potential growth included 
in the 2009 Ageing Report were based on the Commission's forecast made in Spring 2008. In 
order to simulate the order of magnitude of the risks over the long-term related to the ongoing 
economic crisis, alternative simulation scenarios have been carried out. In view of the large 
uncertainty regarding the length of the slump in economic activity, three scenarios were be 
considered: (i) a pessimistic scenario: "permanent shock"; (ii) a less pessimistic scenario: "lost 
decade", and; (iii) an optimistic scenario: "rebound". 
Specifically, the scenarios included in the 2009 Ageing Report incorporate the downward 
revision of the estimated growth potential and its components based on the Commission 
January 2009 forecast. The latest forecast by the Commission was released in May 2009, and 
it entailed a further downward revision of the GDP growth potential in the medium-term.18 On 
the basis of the May 2009 forecast, the alternative scenarios described above have been 
recalculated19:  
− in the 'rebound' scenario, labour productivity growth and labour input (total hours 
worked) is assumed to accelerate to recover the loss in GDP by 2020 induced by the 
crisis.  
− in the 'lost decade' scenario, labour productivity is assumed to reach the AWG baseline 
growth rate in 2020. Labour input (total hours worked) is assumed to reach the 
baseline growth rate in 2020. 
− In the 'permanent shock' scenario, labour productivity growth and employment (total 
hours worked) is assumed to be permanently lower as a result of the crisis.  
The impact on wealth creation of the crisis depends on its duration and the extent to which 
policies are put in place that successfully enhance the growth potential once out of the crisis. 
The effect is strongest in the 'permanent shock' scenario, but also the temporary shock 
scenarios have an adverse impact on the long-term growth potential. There are also 
considerable differences as to the impact at individual country level. Over the period 2007-20, 
the annual growth rate in EU27 is 0.8 to 0.9 p.p. lower on the lost decade and permanent 
shock scenario, respectively. Potential GDP growth for the EU27 coincides with the AWG 
baseline from 2020 in the 'lost decade' and 'rebound' scenarios, while it is slower in the 
'permanent shock' scenario. Over the entire projection period 2007-2060, the average revision 
of potential GDP growth in the 'lost decade' scenario is 0.2 p.p. per year for the EU27. In the 
'permanent shock' worst case scenario, a larger downward revision of the average annual GDP 
growth by 0.4 p.p. would materialize.  
                                                 
18 Potential GDP growth is estimated to be 0.8% in 2009 and 2010 based on the May 2009 forecast, compared 
with 1.3% based on the January 2009 forecast. 
19 The adjustment in each scenario to the 'pre-crisis' AWG baseline is assumed to take place between 2011 and 
2020. 
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Figure 23 – Potential GDP growth compared: different crisis scenarios (annual % change) 
EU27 - potential GDP growth
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Source: Commission services, 2009 Sustainability Report. 
All scenarios show a reduction in GDP per capita over the medium-term, of between 6 and 
9% already by 2015. In the 'rebound' scenario, this would be recuperated by 2020, as the 
slump would be fully reversed. In the 'lost decade' scenario however, there is a reduction by 
assumption in the per-capita GDP level in 2060 compared with the baseline, which mirrors 
the lower expected potential growth in the decade up to 2020. This period is 'lost' in terms of 
accumulated wealth creation. The loss in GDP per capita in the EU27 is around 11% in 2020 
and this loss is carried over the rest of the projection period, since the growth projection 
remains broadly unchanged between 2020 and 2060. In the 'rebound' scenario, the GDP per 
capita by 2060 is the same as in the AWG baseline (the deterioration relative to the baseline 
up to 2014 is offset by the improvement between 2015 and 2020). Finally, a more marked 
reduction in the GDP per capita level is observed in the 'permanent shock' scenario, where 
GDP per capita  is 12% lower than in the AWG baseline in 2020, 16% lower in 2040 and as 
much as 20% lower in 2060, reflecting lower growth throughout the projection period up to 
2060. 
Table 13 - GDP per capita developments in EU27, difference from the AWG baseline, in % 
2010 2015 2020 2040 2060
Rebound -2 -6 0 0 0
Lost decade -2 -9 -11 -11 -11
Permanent shock -2 -9 -12 -16 -20
EU27, GDP per capita, diff. from baseline (in %)
 
Source: Commission services, 2009 Sustainability Report. 
Estimating the possible budgetary impact of the economic crisis 
Based on the three scenarios above, the budgetary impact of those shocks as compared to the 
AWG baseline is estimated. 
− For public pension expenditure, the sensitivity tests of the projections to a change in 
the structural unemployment rate and to the productivity growth rate is used to 
calculate an elasticity of public pension with respect to changes in output.20  
                                                 
20The sensitivity tests carried out in the 2009 Ageing Report were used to calculate the elasticities.  
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− For the other age-related government expenditure items, the projections were obtained 
re-running the different models (health care, long-term care, education and 
unemployment benefits) with the respective alternative macro-economic scenarios. 
It should be recalled that the budgetary impact of an economic crisis in the short-term may be 
larger than indicated by the analysis in this chapter. In particular, it is assumed that the 
budgetary items respond fairly strongly to changes in GDP (there is in general a non-zero 
elasticity with respect to changes in GDP). However, in the (very) short-term some 
government expenditures might be (nearly) inelastic to GDP changes (e.g. health-care 
expenditure may grow at its trend increase for one or a few years on current policies even if 
GDP does not grow at trend rates, or even falls, depending on institutional setup in the 
different countries). Hence, there may be an upside risk to public expenditure in relation to 
GDP in times of a sharp slowdown of economic growth. On the other hand, a sharp 
slowdown, or even a drop of GDP may also bring about a corrective fiscal policy response. In 
previous recessions or 'crisis’, some countries have introduced far-reaching 'crisis measures', 
for instance consisting of broad cuts in public expenditure across the board, thus mitigating 
possible trends increases in public spending. 
 
BOX: Estimating the impact on pension spending of changes in macro-economic variables 
In this report, the potential budgetary impact of varying underlying assumptions (productivity, employment) 
on pension spending, were carried out by the Commission using the sensitivity scenarios on the labour 
productivity growth rate and the structural unemployment rate and not by the Member States using the 
national pension models.  
The elasticity of public pension expenditure with respect to changes in GDP is calculated as follows:  
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⎛ −
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.
.
.ε   (1) 
where:   P: pension expenditure (level) 
  GDP: GDP (level) 
alt.scenario: the higher labour productivity scenario and the higher employment rate 
scenario, respectively 
This elasticity is time-varying so as to capture potential changes in the relationship between GDP growth and 
pension expenditure over time that pension reforms might have induced.  
Once the elasticity is calculated, the alternative 'crisis' scenario is imposed as the 'alt.scenario', and the 
change in pension expenditure vis-à-vis the baseline is solved for. It should be recalled that the alternative 
scenarios for pension expenditure carried out in the projection exercise relate to specific shocks (the 0.25 p.p. 
higher labour productivity growth rate and 1 p.p. lower structural unemployment rate scenarios). For shocks 
of a different size, the calculated elasticity above can be used as a proxy of the effect a shock on pension 
expenditure. However, it should be noted that the elasticity with respect to a shock of a different size might 
be different, if there are non-linearities that this simple model does not reflect.  
 59
Figure 24 – The potential budgetary impact of the crisis (pension and total age-related expenditure) 
EU27, Pension expenditure, change in 
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Source: Commission services, 2009 Sustainability Report. 
In terms of budgetary impact, the nature of the shock determines its magnitude. All of the 
shocks, being negative, lead to higher age-related expenditure as a share of GDP. When 
considering the entire projection period up to 2060, the permanent shock to potential growth 
has a stronger adverse impact on the public expenditure ratio than the temporary shock – the 
lost decade scenario - and the rebound scenario is neutral in terms of budgetary impact up to 
2060.  
There are however different dynamics of the budgetary impact, depending on whether the 
shock is temporary or permanent. The 'lost decade' scenario reveals that the public pension 
spending ratio increases faster in the first ten years of the projection period, and then slowly 
converges to the AWG baseline. Between 2007 and 2020, public pension expenditure in the 
EU would increase by 1 p.p. of GDP more relative to the AWG baseline. Over the whole 
period up to 2060, public pension expenditure would increase by 0.9 p.p. of GDP more 
relative to the AWG baseline.21  
The 'permanent shock' scenario, by contrast, shows a constant widening of the public 
expenditure ratio compared with the baseline. This reflects the fact that a permanently lower 
labour productivity growth rate leads to age-related government expenditure rising faster than 
GDP. Between 2007 and 2020, public pension expenditure would increase by 1.1 p.p. of GDP 
more relative to the AWG baseline. Over the entire projection period however, the public 
pension spending-to-GDP ratio would be 1.4 p.p. of GDP higher in the 'permanent shock' 
scenario compared with the AWG baseline. 
Considering the full budgetary impact of ageing, i.e. including also government expenditure 
on health-care, long-term care, education and unemployment benefits, the 'lost decade' 
scenario reveals that the age-related spending ratio would increase by 1 p.p. of GDP more 
relative to the AWG baseline between 2007 and 2020. Overall, age-related expenditure would 
increase by 1.4 p.p. of GDP more relative to the AWG baseline over the period 2007-2060 in 
the 'lost decade' scenario. 
                                                 
21 Compared with the estimates in the 2009 Ageing Report, the increase in the public pension to GDP ratio for 
the EU27 during 2007-2060 is 0.3 p.p. of GDP higher in both the 'lost decade' and 'permanent shock' scenarios.  
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In the 'permanent shock' scenario, the total increase in age-related expenditure between 2007 
and 2020 would be 1.5 p.p. of GDP higher than in the AWG baseline. Over the entire 
projection period however, the age-related public spending-to-GDP ratio would be 2.0 p.p. of 
GDP higher in the 'permanent shock' scenario compared with the AWG baseline. The Annex 
provides more details by Member State. 
The dynamics of the impact of the crisis on public pension expenditure 
The economic crisis results in falling nominal GDP levels in the very short-term and lower 
potential GDP levels as compared with the AWG baseline. At the same time, public pension 
expenditure is generally reduced less than the decline in income (GDP) in the EU (elasticity 
less than 1), due to e.g. less than 100% wage indexation of public pension benefits or specific 
design of the contribution/entitlement systems. This entails that the public pension to GDP 
ratio increases more than the AWG baseline in the short- to medium-term. In the longer-term, 
the estimated elasticity becomes higher; indicating that new pensions in the future adapt and 
become lower, since contributions made (income) has been lower. This implies that the 
difference between estimated public pension to GDP ratios in the 'lost decade' crisis scenario 
and the AWG baseline becomes smaller over time.  
As a result, the increase in the public pension to GDP ratio measured over the period 2007-60 
is higher in the 'lost decade' crisis scenario than in the AWG baseline. However, the higher 
increase in the pension ratio in the 'lost decade' crisis scenario becomes lower when measured 
over a later time horizon. In fact, the increase in the pension to GDP ratio in the 'lost decade' 
crisis scenario measured in the future, between 2020 and 2060, is lower than in the AWG 
baseline, and up to 2020 it is considerably higher. 
Figure 25 – Dynamics of public pension expenditure compared (baseline and lost decade scenarios, % of 
GDP) 
Pension expenditure, EU27, % of GDP
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Source: Commission services. 
Hence, under the no-policy change assumption, the impact of the crisis reveals that reliance 
(in part) on price indexation as opposed to wage indexation leads to higher pension 
expenditure relative to income (GDP) in the very short-term. Also, since public pension adapt 
in the long-term to income growth (reflecting the general feature of earnings-related pension 
benefits in the EU) under the no-policy change assumption, the higher increase in the 'lost 
decade' crisis scenario over the entire projection period becomes smaller when measured over 
 61
a future time horizon, and it even reverts when measured over a later time horizon of the 
projection period (see Table 16 for country-specific results).  
Conclusions 
In sum, the slowdown in the GDP growth potential is projected to happen already next decade 
in the EU on account of demographic trends, and the economic crisis is aggravating the 
slowdown in a no-policy change scenario. In a longer-term perspective, the EU working age-
population is assumed to start decline early next decade, and labour is projected to act as a 
drag on output growth starting from the 2020s. In a medium-term perspective, the potential 
persistence of the economic crisis may lead to subdued potential growth due to both sluggish 
job and productivity growth already now, implying a risk of a lost decade in terms of wealth 
creation in the EU. These scenarios are a tentative approach that partially revises baseline 
projections. It aims at showing the possible deterioration of GDP levels and public 
expenditure22. 
These long-term simulations illustrate that at this juncture, characterized by very subdued 
economic activity and exceptional uncertainty as to the prospects, there is a very real need to 
put in place all necessary policies to avoid the current financial crisis turning into a permanent 
shock to the key determinants of potential growth (employment and labour productivity) as 
this would have a strong negative impact on future GDP, per capita income levels and 
budgetary conditions. Europe’s ability to get out of the slump fast and to restore high and 
stable growth and sound public finances will depend crucially on its ability to deploy targeted 
and well co-ordinated policy responses built on structural reforms, as stressed by the 
European Economic Recovery Plan23 and illustrated by the 'rebound' scenario.  
The Commission stressed in its Communication on population ageing of 29 April24 the need 
for resolute and determined efforts for EU Member States to put in place all necessary 
policies to make sure that the EU will emerge from the financial and economic crisis with a 
solid growth potential and ability to make full use of its human resources. To get the EU 
economies back on a path of solid long-term growth, expanding the degree to which existing 
factors of production have been used so far is the key.  
For this to happen, it will be essential to implement a comprehensive exit strategy built on 
structural reforms so as to restore confidence in the EUs battered public finances. Notably this 
will involve prolonging working life and increasing participation of youth, women and older 
workers, reforming tax and benefit systems to make work pay along the flexicurity principle, 
reforming pension systems and making health and long-term care systems more efficient, 
alongside the necessary investment in education and research. A strong emphasis on these 
policies at the present juncture will help Europe to both emerge more resiliently from the 
current recession and to address the challenges of an ageing society. By pursuing vigorously 
the reform agenda, by investing massively in the quality of human resources and by removing 
barriers to the full use of its labour force, the EU can emerge stronger from the current 
economic crisis. 
                                                 
22 Specially, in countries such as Spain, where immigration has dropped during the crisis, this tentative pension 
projection overestimates future new pensions and corresponding spending. 
23 COM (2008) 800 final, 26 November 2008. 
24 COM (2009) 180, 29 April 2009. 
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Table 14 – Public pension expenditure under the AWG baseline and difference to the alternative 
scenarios, May 2009 vintage, p.p. change of GDP 
BE 1.8 0.0 1.2 1.3 4.8 0.0 1.6 2.7
BG 0.1 0.0 -0.1 0.0 3.0 0.0 -0.4 -0.1
CZ -0.9 0.0 0.3 0.4 3.3 0.0 0.2 0.5
DK 1.6 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.1
DE 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.4 2.3 0.0 0.4 0.3
EE 0.3 0.0 0.4 0.5 -0.7 0.0 0.1 0.2
IE 1.1 0.0 2.8 2.8 6.1 0.0 5.0 5.0
EL 1.5 0.0 1.3 1.6 12.4 0.0 1.2 3.7
ES 1.1 0.0 1.9 2.0 6.7 0.0 3.3 4.6
FR 0.6 0.0 1.3 1.5 1.0 0.0 1.0 2.0
IT 0.1 0.0 1.2 1.4 -0.4 0.0 0.4 0.9
CY 2.6 0.0 1.3 1.7 11.4 0.0 0.8 1.6
LV -0.3 0.0 1.2 1.3 -0.4 0.0 0.8 1.1
LT 0.1 0.0 0.6 0.6 4.6 0.0 0.9 0.9
LU 1.2 0.0 1.7 1.8 15.2 0.0 0.1 -0.1
HU 0.2 0.0 2.1 2.2 3.0 0.0 0.6 0.9
MT 2.1 0.0 0.8 0.9 6.2 0.0 0.9 1.8
NL 1.2 0.0 0.3 0.3 4.0 0.0 0.4 0.4
AT 0.3 0.0 1.4 1.6 0.9 0.0 1.3 2.7
PL -1.8 0.0 0.6 0.7 -2.8 0.0 0.3 0.8
PT 1.0 0.0 1.5 1.6 2.1 0.0 1.7 2.6
RO 2.3 0.0 0.7 0.7 9.2 0.0 1.3 1.4
SI 1.2 0.0 -0.6 -0.7 8.8 0.0 0.2 -0.1
SK -0.5 0.0 0.5 0.5 3.4 0.0 0.2 0.4
FI 2.6 0.0 1.1 1.2 3.3 0.0 0.6 1.2
SE -0.1 0.0 1.1 1.1 -0.1 0.0 1.0 1.2
UK 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.3 2.7 0.0 0.6 0.7
EU27 0.4 0.0 1.0 1.1 2.4 0.0 0.9 1.4
EA 0.5 0.0 1.2 1.3 2.7 0.0 1.0 1.7
EA12 0.5 0.0 1.2 1.3 2.7 0.0 1.1 1.7
EU15 0.5 0.0 1.0 1.1 2.4 0.0 1.0 1.5
EU10 -0.9 0.0 0.7 0.8 1.0 0.0 0.4 0.7
EU25 0.4 0.0 1.0 1.1 2.3 0.0 0.9 1.4
Permanent 
shock Rebound
Lost 
decade 
Permanent 
shock
Public pension-to-GDP ratio, p.p. of GDP
Change 2007-2020 Change 2007-2060
Baseline (% 
of GDP)
Difference from baseline
Baseline (% 
of GDP)
Difference from baseline
Country Rebound
Lost 
decade 
 
Source: Commission services. 
Note: Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. According to the revised pension projections, public 
pension expenditure is projected to decrease by 0.4 p.p. of GDP between 2007 and 2060. The revised projection 
is not included in this table. 
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Table 15 – Total age-related expenditure under the AWG baseline and difference to the alternative 
scenarios, May 2009 vintage, p.p. change of GDP 
Country
BE 1.7 0.0 1.7 2.2 6.9 0.1 2.2 3.7
BG -0.1 0.0 -0.2 -0.1 3.7 0.0 -0.5 -0.3
CZ -0.7 0.0 0.3 0.4 5.5 0.0 0.2 0.4
DK 2.6 0.0 -0.3 0.0 2.6 0.0 -0.3 0.0
DE 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.7 4.8 0.0 0.6 0.6
EE 0.2 0.0 0.5 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.2 0.3
IE 1.4 0.0 5.0 5.3 8.9 0.0 7.6 7.9
EL 1.9 0.0 1.3 1.6 15.9 0.0 1.2 3.7
ES 1.4 0.0 2.8 3.1 9.0 0.0 4.4 5.9
FR 0.9 0.0 1.5 1.9 2.7 0.0 1.2 2.3
IT 0.3 0.0 1.3 1.6 1.6 0.0 0.6 1.2
CY 1.3 0.1 1.6 2.0 10.8 0.0 1.1 2.0
LV -0.7 0.0 1.6 1.7 0.4 0.0 1.3 1.6
LT -0.7 0.0 0.8 0.8 5.4 0.0 1.2 1.1
LU 1.2 0.0 2.2 2.4 18.0 0.0 0.8 0.7
HU -0.3 0.0 2.5 2.6 4.1 0.0 1.0 1.4
MT 2.3 0.0 0.7 0.9 10.2 0.0 0.7 1.7
NL 2.1 0.0 0.6 1.0 9.4 0.0 0.8 1.2
AT 0.3 0.0 1.6 1.9 3.1 0.0 1.5 3.1
PL -2.7 0.0 0.5 0.7 -2.4 0.0 0.3 0.8
PT 0.8 0.0 1.8 2.1 3.4 0.0 2.0 3.1
RO 2.0 0.0 0.8 0.8 10.1 0.0 1.5 1.5
SI 2.0 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 12.8 0.0 0.3 0.1
SK -0.7 0.0 0.4 0.5 5.2 0.0 0.2 0.3
FI 3.0 0.0 1.3 1.6 6.3 0.0 0.8 1.6
SE -0.3 0.0 2.1 2.3 2.6 0.0 2.3 2.6
UK 0.8 0.0 0.6 0.6 5.1 0.0 0.8 0.9
EU27 0.5 0.0 1.3 1.5 4.7 0.0 1.4 2.0
EA 0.7 0.0 1.5 1.8 5.2 0.0 1.6 2.4
EA12 0.7 0.0 1.5 1.8 5.2 0.0 1.6 2.4
EU15 0.7 0.0 1.3 1.6 4.8 0.0 1.4 2.1
EU10 -1.4 0.0 0.7 0.8 2.1 0.0 0.4 0.8
EU25 0.5 0.0 1.3 1.5 4.7 0.0 1.4 2.0
Change 2007-2020 Change 2007-2060
Baseline 
(% of GDP)
Rebound - 
Baseline
Lost 
decade - 
Baseline
Permanent 
shock - 
Baseline
Baseline 
(% of GDP)
Rebound - 
Baseline
Lost 
decade - 
Baseline
Permanent 
shock - 
Baseline
Age-related expenditure-to-GDP ratio, p.p. of GDP
 
Source: Commission services. 
Note: Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. According to the revised pension projections, public 
pension expenditure is projected to decrease by 0.4 p.p. of GDP between 2007 and 2060. The revised projection 
is not included in this table. 
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Table 16 – Changes in the public pension expenditure to GDP ratio under different time horizons, AWG 
baseline and lost decade scenarios, p.p. change of GDP 
Baseline Lost decade Baseline Lost decade Baseline Lost decade
(1) (2) (3)=(2)-(1) (4) (5) (6)=(5)-(4) (7) (8) (9)=(8)-(7)
BE 4.8 6.3 1.6 4.5 5.7 1.2 2.9 4.5 1.6
BG 3.0 2.6 -0.4 2.2 1.5 -0.7 2.9 2.2 -0.7
CZ 3.3 3.5 0.2 4.0 4.0 0.0 4.2 4.1 -0.1
DK 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -0.2 -0.3 -0.1 -1.5 -1.0 0.5
DE 2.3 2.7 0.4 2.5 3.9 1.4 2.3 3.0 0.7
EE -0.7 -0.6 0.1 -1.6 -2.0 -0.4 -1.0 -1.6 -0.7
IE 6.1 11.1 5.0 5.9 10.1 4.2 5.0 8.2 3.2
EL 12.4 13.6 1.2 12.5 3.8 -8.7 10.9 11.3 0.4
ES 6.7 10.0 3.3 6.2 8.9 2.7 5.6 7.7 2.0
FR 1.0 2.0 1.0 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.4 0.5 0.1
IT -0.4 0.0 0.4 -0.4 -0.4 0.0 -0.5 -1.0 -0.5
CY 11.4 12.3 0.8 10.8 10.4 -0.3 8.8 9.1 0.3
LV -0.4 0.5 0.8 0.0 0.2 0.2 -0.1 0.0 0.1
LT 4.6 5.5 0.9 4.9 5.5 0.7 4.5 5.3 0.8
LU 15.2 15.3 0.1 15.3 14.9 -0.4 14.1 13.8 -0.3
HU 3.0 3.6 0.6 2.6 2.5 -0.1 2.8 1.7 -1.1
MT 6.2 7.0 0.9 5.1 9.3 4.2 4.1 4.5 0.4
NL 4.0 4.4 0.4 4.0 4.3 0.3 2.8 3.5 0.8
AT 0.9 2.2 1.3 1.0 2.1 1.1 0.6 1.2 0.6
PL -2.8 -2.5 0.3 -2.1 -2.2 -0.2 -1.0 -1.1 -0.1
PT 2.1 3.7 1.7 1.5 2.6 1.1 1.1 2.2 1.1
RO 9.2 10.6 1.3 7.4 8.5 1.0 7.0 8.1 1.1
SI 8.8 9.0 0.2 8.5 11.7 3.2 7.5 9.8 2.3
SK 3.4 3.6 0.2 3.6 3.5 -0.1 3.9 3.6 -0.3
FI 3.3 4.0 0.6 2.6 2.8 0.1 0.7 1.4 0.7
SE -0.1 0.9 1.0 -0.2 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.5 0.5
UK 2.7 3.3 0.6 2.5 3.2 0.7 2.4 3.1 0.7
EU27 2.4 3.3 0.9 2.3 3.1 0.8 2.0 2.4 0.5
EA 2.7 3.8 1.0 2.6 3.5 0.9 2.2 2.7 0.5
2007-60 2010-60 2015-60
 
Source: Commission services. 
Note: Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. According to the revised pension projections, public 
pension expenditure is projected to decrease by 0.4 p.p. of GDP between 2007 and 2060. The revised projection 
is not included in this table. 
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Table 17 – Potential GDP growth compared: deviation from AWG baseline in p.p., estimates based on the May 2009 Commission forecast 
Country 2007-10 2011-20 2021-40 2041-60 2007-60 2007-10 2011-20 2021-40 2041-60 2007-60 2007-10 2011-20 2021-40 2041-60 2007-60 Country
BE 0.8 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 BE
BG 0.7 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.7 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 BG
CZ 1.2 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 CZ
DK 0.8 0.6 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 DK
DE 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 DE
EE 3.4 1.6 0.3 0.2 0.7 3.4 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.5 3.4 -1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 EE
IE 3.1 2.5 0.2 0.2 0.9 3.1 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.1 -1.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 IE
EL 0.8 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.8 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 EL
ES 1.6 1.3 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.6 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.6 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 ES
FR 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 FR
IT 0.7 0.8 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 IT
CY 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.8 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 CY
LV 4.1 2.2 0.3 0.2 0.9 4.1 2.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 4.1 -1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 LV
LT 2.7 1.8 0.3 0.2 0.7 2.7 1.6 0.0 0.0 0.5 2.7 -1.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 LT
LU 1.5 1.6 0.3 0.3 0.6 1.5 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.4 1.5 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 LU
HU 2.0 1.6 0.3 0.2 0.6 2.0 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.4 2.0 -0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 HU
MT 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 MT
NL 0.5 0.7 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 NL
AT 0.7 0.6 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.7 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 AT
PL 1.2 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 PL
PT 1.2 1.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 1.2 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 PT
RO 1.5 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.5 1.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.5 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 RO
SI 1.1 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.4 1.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.1 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 SI
SK 1.4 0.9 0.3 0.2 0.4 1.4 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.4 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 SK
FI 1.2 0.8 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.2 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 FI
SE 1.1 1.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.1 1.1 0.0 0.0 0.3 1.1 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 SE
UK 1.0 1.0 0.2 0.2 0.5 1.0 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 UK
EA 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 EA
EU27 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 EU27
EU15 0.9 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.9 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.9 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 EU15
EU10 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.2 0.4 1.5 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.5 -0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 EU10
EU25 1.0 0.9 0.2 0.2 0.4 1.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.2 1.0 -0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 EU25
Annual average GDP growth rate, difference from 2009 Ageing Report (2009 Ageing Report - April 2009 update)
Permanent shock Lost decade Rebound
 
Source: Commission services. Note: Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. According to the revised pension projections, public pension expenditure is projected to 
decrease by 0.4 p.p. of GDP between 2007 and 2060. The revised projection is not included in this table. 
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Annex 14: Sustainability indicators in the 2009/10 SCPs  
 
Table 18 – Sustainability indicators in the 2009 scenario and the Programme scenario based on the 2009/10 SCPs 
S2 IBP* LTC S2 IBP LTC
BE 6.5 1.7 4.8 4.6 -0.2 4.8
BG 2.8 1.0 1.9 0.3 -1.6 1.9
CZ 9.8 5.8 4.0 6.2 2.2 4.0
DK -1.4 -1.8 0.4 0.5 0.1 0.4
DE 4.5 0.7 3.7 4.6 0.9 3.7
EE 1.2 1.3 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 0.0
IE 14.8 8.3 6.5 6.4 -0.1 6.5
EL 20.3 8.7 11.5 9.6 -1.9 11.5
ES 15.3 9.6 5.7 6.8 1.1 5.7
FR 7.1 5.3 1.8 2.9 1.0 1.8
IT 2.6 1.1 1.6 -0.1 -1.6 1.6
CY 12.5 4.1 8.4 9.0 0.6 8.4
LV 9.0 7.6 1.4 1.1 -0.3 1.4
LT 10.4 6.9 3.5 4.3 0.8 3.5
LU 12.7 -0.7 13.4 15.6 2.1 13.4
HU -1.3 -1.6 0.3 0.2 0.0 0.3
MT 6.4 1.1 5.3 6.6 1.3 5.3
NL 8.5 3.6 4.9 8.1 3.2 4.9
AT 4.6 1.4 3.2 4.0 0.8 3.2
PL 5.6 6.0 -0.4 0.5 0.8 -0.4
PT 8.9 7.0 1.9 1.6 -0.2 1.9
RO 9.7 4.6 5.1 3.8 -1.3 5.1
SI 12.2 4.1 8.1 8.6 0.4 8.1
SK 8.5 5.2 3.3 5.2 1.9 3.3
FI 4.3 0.2 4.1 7.0 3.0 4.1
SE 0.5 -1.5 1.9 1.1 -0.8 1.9
UK 13.5 9.9 3.6 5.5 1.9 3.6
EU-27 7.5 4.3 3.3 6.0 2.8 3.3
EA 6.8 3.3 3.6 6.1 2.5 3.6
2009 scenario Programme scenario
 
Source: Commission services 
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Annex 15: The total cost of ageing in the Member States 
 
Table 19 – Projected change in age-related expenditure, 2007-2060, p.p. of GDP  
Level Change Change Level Change Change Level Change Change Level Change Change Level Change Change Level Change Change 
2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007 2007
2007 2035 2060 2007 2035 2060 2007 2035 2060 2007 2035 2060 2007 2035 2060 2007 2035 2060
BE 10.0 4.4 4.8 7.6 1.0 1.2 1.5 0.7 1.4 1.9 -0.4 -0.4 5.5 -0.1 0.0 26.5 5.6 6.9 BE
BG 8.3 0.7 3.0 4.7 0.6 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.3 -0.5 -0.2 16.6 0.8 3.7 BG
CZ 7.8 -0.2 3.3 6.2 1.4 2.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.5 -0.5 -0.3 17.9 0.9 5.5 CZ
DK 9.1 1.4 0.1 5.9 0.8 1.0 1.7 1.1 1.5 1.0 -0.2 -0.2 7.1 0.4 0.2 24.8 3.6 2.6 DK
DE 10.4 1.4 2.3 7.4 1.4 1.8 0.9 0.7 1.4 0.9 -0.3 -0.3 3.9 -0.5 -0.4 23.6 2.6 4.8 DE
EE 5.6 -0.2 -0.7 4.9 0.7 1.2 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 3.7 -0.4 -0.2 14.3 0.1 0.4 EE
IE 5.2 2.8 6.1 5.8 0.9 1.8 0.8 0.4 1.3 0.8 0.1 0.1 4.5 -0.4 -0.3 17.2 3.7 8.9 IE
EL 11.7 7.7 12.4 5.0 0.9 1.4 1.4 0.8 2.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 3.7 -0.3 0.0 22.1 9.1 15.9 EL
ES 8.4 3.4 6.7 5.5 1.0 1.6 0.5 0.5 0.9 1.3 -0.4 -0.4 3.5 -0.3 0.1 19.3 4.3 9.0 ES
FR 13.0 1.4 1.0 8.1 1.0 1.2 1.4 0.5 0.8 1.2 -0.3 -0.3 4.7 0.0 0.0 28.4 2.7 2.7 FR
IT 14.0 1.2 -0.4 5.9 0.9 1.1 1.7 0.5 1.3 0.4 0.0 0.0 4.1 -0.6 -0.3 26.0 2.0 1.6 IT
CY 6.3 5.4 11.4 2.7 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 6.1 -1.2 -1.2 15.4 4.5 10.8 CY
LV 5.4 0.7 -0.4 3.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 3.7 -0.6 -0.3 13.2 0.6 0.4 LV
LT 6.8 1.9 4.6 4.5 0.7 1.1 0.5 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.0 0.0 4.0 -1.0 -0.9 15.8 1.8 5.4 LT
LU 8.7 8.0 15.2 5.8 0.9 1.2 1.4 0.7 2.0 0.4 0.0 0.0 3.8 -0.5 -0.5 20.0 9.1 18.0 LU
HU 10.9 -2.7 -0.4 5.8 0.7 1.3 0.3 0.1 0.4 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 4.4 -0.7 -0.4 21.6 -2.6 0.8 HU
MT 7.2 2.5 6.2 4.7 2.2 3.3 1.0 0.9 1.6 0.4 0.0 0.0 5.0 -1.2 -1.0 18.2 4.4 10.2 MT
NL 6.6 3.4 4.0 4.8 0.9 1.0 3.4 2.8 4.7 1.1 -0.1 -0.1 4.6 -0.2 -0.2 20.5 6.9 9.4 NL
AT 12.8 1.2 0.9 6.5 1.2 1.5 1.3 0.6 1.2 0.7 0.0 0.0 4.8 -0.6 -0.5 26.0 2.3 3.1 AT
PL 11.6 -2.3 -2.8 4.0 0.7 1.0 0.4 0.2 0.7 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 4.4 -1.3 -1.2 20.5 -2.7 -2.4 PL
PT 11.4 0.9 2.1 7.2 1.0 1.9 0.1 0.0 0.1 1.2 -0.4 -0.4 4.6 -0.6 -0.3 24.5 1.1 3.4 PT
RO 6.6 5.0 9.2 3.5 0.7 1.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 2.8 -0.6 -0.5 13.1 5.0 10.1 RO
SI 9.9 4.9 8.8 6.6 1.4 1.9 1.1 0.9 1.8 0.2 0.0 0.0 5.1 -0.2 0.4 22.9 6.9 12.8 SI
SK 6.8 1.0 3.4 5.0 1.5 2.3 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.1 -0.1 -0.1 3.1 -1.0 -0.8 15.2 1.6 5.2 SK
FI 10.0 3.9 3.3 5.5 0.9 1.0 1.8 1.7 2.6 1.2 -0.2 -0.2 5.7 -0.2 -0.3 24.2 6.1 6.3 FI
SE 9.5 -0.1 -0.1 7.2 0.6 0.8 3.5 1.3 2.3 0.9 -0.1 -0.1 6.0 -0.3 -0.3 27.2 1.5 2.6 SE
UK 6.6 1.3 2.7 7.5 1.2 1.9 0.8 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 -0.1 18.9 2.7 5.1 UK
NO 8.9 4.3 4.7 5.6 1.0 1.3 2.2 1.2 2.7 0.2 0.2 0.2 7.9 0.1 0.1 24.9 6.8 9.0 NO
EU27 10.2 1.7 2.4 6.7 1.0 1.5 1.2 0.6 1.1 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 4.3 -0.3 -0.2 23.1 2.7 4.7 EU27
EA 11.1 2.1 2.8 6.7 1.0 1.4 1.3 0.7 1.4 1.0 -0.2 -0.2 4.2 -0.3 -0.2 24.3 3.2 5.2 EA
EU15 10.2 1.8 2.4 6.9 1.0 1.5 1.3 0.6 1.2 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 4.3 -0.3 -0.1 23.5 3.0 4.8 EU15
EU12 9.2 0.4 2.3 4.7 0.8 1.3 0.3 0.2 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 3.9 -0.9 -0.7 18.3 0.4 3.4 EU12
EU25 10.2 1.6 2.3 6.8 1.0 1.5 1.2 0.6 1.2 0.8 -0.2 -0.2 4.3 -0.3 -0.2 23.3 2.7 4.7 EU25
EA12 11.1 2.1 2.8 6.7 1.0 1.4 1.3 0.7 1.4 1.0 -0.2 -0.2 4.2 -0.3 -0.2 24.4 3.3 5.2 EA12
EU10 9.7 -0.5 1.0 4.9 0.9 1.4 0.4 0.2 0.6 0.2 0.0 0.0 4.2 -1.0 -0.8 19.2 -0.4 2.1 EU10
Education Total Pensions Health care Long-term care Unemployment benefits
 
Source: 2009 Ageing Report. 
Note: Hungary reformed its pension system in 2009. Following the reform, its impact was assessed through a peer review by the AWG, and endorsed by the EPC at their 22 
February 2010 meeting. According to the revised pension projections, public pension expenditure is projected to decrease from 10.9% of GDP in 2007 to 10.5% of GDP in 
2060, i.e. by 0.4 p.p. of GDP, compared with the projection in the 2009 Ageing Report, where an increase of 3 p.p. of GDP between 2007 and 2060 was projected. 
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Annex 16: Pension expenditure, benefit ratio and net 
theoretical replacement rate 
 
Figure 26 - The pension expenditure ratio and the benefit ratio in EU Member States (2007-60) 
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Source: Commission services 
Note: The horizontal axis shows the projected public pension expenditure as a share of GDP over the 
period 2007-60. The vertical axis shows to the projected benefit ratio over the period 2007-60. The benefit 
ratio is defined as the average pension in relation to the average wage. The calculation of the benefit ratio 
includes public pensions and in addition private pensions to the extent this information was available in the 
2009 Ageing Report. See the 2009 Ageing Report for further details. Hungary reformed its pension system 
in 2009. According to the revised pension projections, public pension expenditure is projected to decrease 
by 0.4 p.p. of GDP between 2007 and 2060. The revised projection is not included in this table. 
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Figure 27 - The pension expenditure ratio (2008-2048) and the net theoretical replacement rates 
(2006-2046) in EU Member States 25 
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25 Note that different methodologies apply to TRR and AWG pension expenditure projections 
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Annex 17: Possible debt developments over the 
long-term 
 
Rising government deficits and low growth are leaving a legacy of fast growing 
government debt ratios in the EU. Going forward, some stylised scenarios for public 
finances up to 2030 are analyzed. These projections are based on the Commission 
services’ spring 2009 forecast till 2010, which are then extended into the future taking 
into account the ‘lost decade’ macroeconomic scenario (see Chapter II).  
Scenario 1 shows the outcome for this stylised scenario under the assumption of no fiscal 
consolidation measures (see Figure 28). The gross debt-to-GDP ratio would rise steadily 
over the projection period. By 2015, the average debt ratio would be at around 100% of 
GDP, both in the EU and the euro area. It will continue increasing to around 120% of 
GDP in 2020, though with large differences across countries. 
Figure 28 – EU27, long-term debt projections under alternative assumptions 
• 
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Source: Commission services. 
Note: The following assumptions were made:  
(i) the increase in age-related expenditure is consistent with the macroeconomic scenario. Age-related 
expenditure in the EU increases, on average, by 0.4 p.p. of GDP in the EU as a whole up to 2020 and by 1.9 
p.p. up to 2030;  
(ii) the tax-to-GDP ratios are projected to converge to their pre-2007 level for countries with 2010 tax 
burdens below their 2007 level. For countries with 2010 tax-to-GDP ratio above the pre-crisis level, it is 
assumed that the tax ratio remains constant;  
(iii) the implicit interest rate on government debt converges to 3% in real terms (as in the 2009 Ageing 
Report) in 2020 and remains constant thereafter;  
(iv) specific stimulus measures projected for 2010 are withdrawn in 2011;  
(v) zero stock-flow adjustment; this means no further purchases of financial assets or recapitalisations of 
financial institutions, nor disposal of such assets.  
For details, see the 2009 Sustainability Report. 
 
 77
Figure 28 also shows the results of two further scenarios. In Scenario 2, from 2011 on, all 
Member States would implement fiscal consolidation efforts (measured in terms of 
structural primary balance) of 0.5% of GDP per year until they reach their medium-term 
objectives (MTOs).26 The graph clearly illustrates that this consolidation effort – which is 
the benchmark consolidation effort in the SGP – would not be enough to stabilise, let 
alone reduce, the debt ratio by 2030. 
A consolidation effort of 1% of GDP per year (Scenario 3) until the MTOs of each 
Member State is reached would stabilise the government debt ratio in the EU in 2016. 
Note, however, that by 2030, the debt ratio would still be substantially larger than in the 
pre-crisis years, and 5 points above the Maastricht reference value.  
Though these scenarios are based on a number of simplifying assumptions, they show 
that a fast debt reduction requires serious consolidation efforts, sales of assets and may 
also, in some countries require the update of their MTOs to more ambitious levels. 
Structural measures that contribute to avoid a ‘lost decade’ of slow GDP growth would 
also decisively contribute to an early stabilisation, and then fast reduction, of the 
government debt ratio. 
                                                 
26 The MTOs of Member States based on the 2008/09 round of stability and convergence programmes. 
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Annex 18: Medium-term budgetary objectives (MTO) 
and fiscal positions, % of GDP 
 
Table 20 - MTOs in the 2009/10 Stability and Convergence Programmes  
MTO
2009/10 
SCPs 2008 2009 2010 2008 2009 2010
BE 0.5 -1.2 -6.1 -5.0 -2.0 -4.5 -3.7
BG 0.5 1.8 -3.9 -2.8 0.0 -2.8 -1.1
CZ -1.0 -2.7 -5.9 -5.7 -4.5 -5.1 -4.7
DK 0.0 3.4 -2.8 -5.6 3.3 0.6 -3.0
DE -0.5 0.0 -3.3 -5.0 -1.5 -1.8 -3.6
EE 0.0 -2.8 -1.7 -2.4 -4.1 1.3 0.2
IE -0.5 -7.3 -14.3 -11.7 -7.0 -11.4 -8.7
EL 0.0 -7.7 -13.5 -9.4 -9.6 -14.1 -8.2
ES 0.0 -4.1 -11.2 -9.8 -4.4 -9.6 -7.8
FR 0.0 -3.3 -7.6 -8.0 -3.7 -6.2 -6.6
IT 0.0 -2.7 -5.2 -5.2 -3.3 -3.3 -3.6
CY 0.0 0.9 -6.1 -7.1 -0.4 -5.8 -6.3
LV -1.0 -4.1 -8.9 -8.6 -6.4 -6.3 -5.7
LT 0.5 -3.3 -8.9 -8.4 -5.7 -6.7 -6.1
LU 0.5 2.9 -0.7 -3.5 2.0 1.2 -1.4
HU -1.5 -3.8 -4.0 -4.0 -5.1 -2.2 -2.1
MT 0.0 -4.5 -3.8 -4.3 -4.9 -3.1 -3.8
NL -0.5 0.7 -5.3 -6.3 -0.5 -3.6 -4.9
AT 0.0 -0.5 -3.5 -4.7 -1.7 -2.4 -3.6
PL -1.0 -3.7 -7.1 -7.3 -4.6 -6.9 -6.5
PT -0.5 -2.9 -9.4 -8.5 -2.9 -8.3 -7.5
RO -0.7 -5.4 -8.3 -8.8 -8.2 -7.8 -6.9
SI -1.0 -1.7 -5.5 -6.1 -4.8 -3.8 -4.4
SK 0.0 -2.3 -6.8 -6.0 -4.5 -6.4 -5.4
FI 0.5 4.1 -2.4 -4.0 2.1 0.3 -1.4
SE 1.0 2.5 -0.8 -2.3 1.4 1.9 -0.2
UK : -4.9 -11.4 -11.8 -5.7 -9.7 -10.4
EU-27 : -2.3 -6.8 -7.2 -3.2 -5.2 -5.6
EA : -2.0 -6.3 -6.6 -2.9 -4.8 -5.1
Nominal balance Cyclically adjusted balance
 
Source: Commission services, AMECO. 
Note: The MTOs are those of the 2009/10 SCPs. The government balances are those of the Commission 
services Spring 2010 forecast. 
 
